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Introduction 
 
“Colonel, if you register a letter, it means that it is of value isn’t it? 
And if you pay fifteen cents  for registering it, the government will 
have to take extra care of it and even pay you back its full value if 
it is lost. Isn’t that so? 
“Yes. I suppose it’s so.” 
“Well Senator Balloon put fifteen cents worth of stamps on each 
of those seven huge boxes of old clothes, and shipped that ton of 
second-hand rubbish, old boots and pantaloons and what not 
through the mails as registered matter! It was an ingenious thing 
and it had a genuine touch of humor about it, too. I think there is 
more real talent among our public men of to-day than there was 
among those of old times – a far more fertile fancy, a much 
happier ingenuity. Now, Colonel, can you picture Jefferson, or 
Washington, or John Adams franking their wardrobes through the 
mails and adding the facetious idea of making the government 
responsible for the cargo for the sum of one dollar and five cents? 
Statesmen were dull creatures in those days. I have a much 
greater admiration for Senator Balloon.”
1 
 
                                       The corrupt Senators in Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner’s The 
Gilded Age may have been fictional, though loosely based on real politicians, to the general 
public crooked Senators were for real in 1873, the year the book was published. The abuse 
of franking privileges was one of the lesser evils. Just in the 1870s six Senators were accused 
of corruption.
2
 Only one of them resigned his seat, the others were exonerated by a jury of 
their peers. Sometimes this was by majority report, with a minority not convinced of the 
immaculacy of the accused. But it still took a few decades and the muckraking disclosures of 
the close connection between Senators and special interests in the 1900s before the public 
gave a signal that reform and direct democracy at a federal level was long overdue. 
                                       The ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment was unique. For the 
first time in the history of the American Constitution an important feature of one of the 
three branches was altered by the people: the members of the Senate would not be elected 
by the States, as the Framers of the Constitution ordered at the Constitutional Convention of 
1787, but instead be chosen directly by the people of the State. So the States gave up one of 
                                                           
1
 Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner, The Gilded Age, A Tale of To-Day (Chicago 1873), 187. 
 
2
 Kansas Republican Senator Samuel C. Pomeroy in 1872; Arkansas Republican Senator Powell Clayton in 1872; 
Kansas Republican Senator Alexander Caldwell in 1873, he resigned; Alabama Senator George E. Spenser in 
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their own constitutional prerogatives. The ratification ended a process of 21 years of debate 
in Congress, which initially started in 1826. This thesis will look into the way the Framers 
decided on the character of the Senate, and why they gave the power to elect it to the 
States. It will analyze how the States lost control over those elections and how Congress took 
over that control. 
                                       Since the debate on the direct election of the Senate to a large extent 
was stimulated by two reform movements at the end of the nineteenth century and the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the Populists and the Progressives, the thesis will 
determine how and why these movements grew among the population and which catalyzing 
role they played in the reform of decision making and electoral reform at local and state 
level. It will look into the debate in the Senate on the direct election and the final decision on 
the issue. Ever since the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment it has been disputed 
between, on the one hand, constitutional traditionalists, who are of the opinion that the 
works of the Framers should as little as possible be tampered with, and on the other hand, 
modernizers, who think the Constitution is ‘a living text’, intended to be amended from time 
to time. This thesis will look into the arguments of both sides and take position in the 
dispute. 
                                       Finally, this thesis will consider if direct election of Senators indeed 
improved the image and standing of the chamber and analyze three issues, which should be 
dealt with, because they are of influence on that image and standing. The first one is the 
issue of occurring vacancies in the Senate. The present procedure can be qualified as an 
imperfection of the Seventeenth Amendment. The second one is the issue of equal 
representation of the States in the Senate. The solution of the Framers, as set down in 
Article V of the Constitution
3
, has become an anachronism in the opinion of some experts. 
The third one, the practice of the filibuster and the cloture, damages the reputation of the 
Senate and diminishes its role as a chamber of reflection. This is, however, not a 
constitutional issue, but an internal affair, for it involves the rules and procedures of the 
Senate itself. This thesis will consider the problems and look into improvement.                                        
                                       The coming into being of ‘the greatest deliberative body in the world’
4
 
was the result of a compromise, the Great or Connecticut Compromise, on the composition 
of the upper house, on its way of election and on its powers. It was a solution to a deep 
division between the thirteen original States of the new republic, that was only 
wholeheartedly supported by five of them. The two largest States, Virginia and Pennsylvania, 
were not among them. Apart from Pennsylvania delegate James Wilson it was a common 
feeling in the Convention, that the people should not be directly involved in the business of 
                                                           
3
 Article V: …’and that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate’. 
4
 From ‘A letter From Ex-President Buchanan’, New York Times, March 29, 1867. 
 5
the Senate. The House of Representatives should be where the passions of the people were 
freely followed, but, as James Madison opinionated, ‘the use of the Senate is to consist in its 
proceedings with more coolness, with more system and with more wisdom, than the 
popular branch.
5
 
                                       In Federalist 55 Madison expressed the delegates’ reservations about 
an influential and sizeable lower house, for in a mass passion will always win from reason. Or 
in Madison’s comparison: ‘Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian 
assembly would still have been a mob’.
6
 The Framers wanted the upper chamber to secure 
qualities like reflection, continuity and stability, and therefore decided to have one third of it 
chosen concurrent to the House. With two thirds of the Senate seats not up for regular 
Congressional elections  continuity was guaranteed. In theory the whole House – 59 
members in the First Congress, 435 in the 112
th
 – could be renewed at each and every 
election, but not the Senate. 
                                       Since one of the main characterizations of a compromise is that it is to 
nobody’s complete satisfaction, efforts were made to alter it. Irregularities, corruption and 
deadlocks around the selection of the United States Senators by the State Legislatures in the 
second half of the nineteenth century ultimately initiated a grass roots reform campaign for 
direct democracy and the direct election of the Senators. This movement was particularly 
strong in the Midwestern agrarian States and the new States in the West and partly 
coincided with the emergence of the Populists and the Progressives, who challenged the 
established political elite, especially of the Republican party. Republican Senators, for fear of 
the new Democratic masses, created by the labor movement and the flow of immigrants 
from Europe, would use the Athenian mob analogy of Madison to reject a change in the 
system. Under pressure of an increasing demand of the States for a new constitutional 
convention the Senate abandoned its stiff resistance to the electoral reform. 
                                       The manner of the Senators’ election was easy to alter compared to 
the other question that divided the 1787 Convention: equal representation, which also 
resulted in a compromise. But is was one, that was almost impossible to change, because it 
needed the approval of every State in the Union. The Framers laid down the rights of twelve 
States, represented at the Convention, unaware that almost two centuries later fifty States 
could claim the same position under that same Article V of the Constitution. The basic 
assumption was the same as with that most important internal rule of the new Senate itself, 
a rule that is often mistaken as a constitutional right, the filibuster. Both had the intention to 
                                                           
5
 Gaillard Hunt & James B. Scott (ed), Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James Madison 
(New York 1920) Session of Thursday, June 7, 1787 71. Data also at 
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6
 Garry Wills (ed), The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay (New York 1982), 
281. 
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avoid a tyranny of the majority and have often been criticized as its mirror image: the 
tyranny of the minority. Compared to balancing the interests of minorities and majorities the 
transfer of power from the State Legislatures to the people of the State was an easy choice. 
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Chapter One:  A Tight Bond Between State And Government 
      
                                       Exactly 126 years before the American voter obtained the right to 
choose his Senators directly, James Wilson, a delegate for the commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, wanted all members of the national 
legislative assembly to be directly elected by the people.
7
 He was not alone in this 
preference for the election of the lower house, but Wilson was the sole advocate among the 
55 delegates who also wanted the members of the upper house to be chosen that way. 
There was not going to be a concrete proposal concerning this matter at the Convention in 
Philadelphia. 
                                       Since there happened to be no quorum, it took the delegates eleven 
days before they could start the meeting, and soon after that the commonwealth of Virginia 
immediately set the agenda. A year before this State took the initiative to call together this 
Convention, which, in the first place, was meant to fix the weak parts of the Articles of 
Confederation and Perpetual Union, the first written constitution of the new United States 
of America. The government of the thirteen colonies was fragile and powerless and the lack 
of central authority made it vulnerable. ‘Something had to be done. If it were not, a 
confederacy of small sovereign republics, a radical institution in a world of monarchies, 
might collapse or be conquered’.
8
 
                                       The idea of a constitutional convention was not well received all over 
the thirteen States, particularly not in Virginia. Patrick Henry, leader of the independence 
movement in the State and its first governor after 1776, refused to be delegated to 
Philadelphia. Richard Henry Lee and Thomas Nelson, Virginian signers of the Declaration of 
Independence, took the same position. Rhode Island stayed away permanently from the 
Convention, New Hampshire showed up after some time and other States came and went as 
they liked. The 55 delegates from twelve States were a mixed group of politicians, lawyers, 
businessmen and property owners. Proponents as well as opponents of a strong central 
government were present, according to historian Max Farrand, with the former in the 
majority.
9
 
                                                           
7
 Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott (ed), The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 which framed the 
Constitution of the United States of America reported by James Madison (New York 1920), Session of Thursday,  
May 31, 1787, 32.   
8
 Robert Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause – The American Revolution, 1763-1789, (New York 1982/2005), 640-
641. 
9
 Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution, (New Haven 1913), 196-201.  
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                                       A number of prominent Framers - signers of the Declaration of 
Independence – were absent. John Jay was Secretary of State – at that time still called 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs – and John Adams and Thomas Jefferson were United States 
ambassadors in, respectively, London and Paris. In a letter to Adams Jefferson gave his 
opinion about the delegates: ‘It is really an assembly of demigods’.
10
 That positive judgment 
continued through the years, but Farrand concluded that this was somewhat exaggerated, 
since Jefferson based his opinion on the reputation of the delegates, and not on their 
expertise. Farrand quoted an unidentified contemporary, who insisted ‘that twenty 
assemblies of equal number might be collected equally respectable both in point of ability, 
integrity, and patriotism’. Perhaps, Farrand said, it would be safer to regard the Convention 
as a fairly representative body.
11
 It was one that represented a multitude of opinions, as 
would soon be noticeable. 
                                       Governor Edmund Randolph, almost at the start, introduced fifteen 
proposals, which later became known as the Virginia Plan and had the establishment of a 
strong national government as a common theme. A national legislative assembly was part of 
it.
12
 The sole role of the Executive would be, just as the name said, to execute the laws. Soon 
after this the debate concentrated on issues as the form of the legislature – be it one or two 
houses – the number of the members and the way it was drawn up. 
                                       A few delegates were clear about their starting points and their 
consequences. Roger Sherman of the Connecticut delegation rejected the proposal of the 
Virginians to have the people choose the lower house. The people should have as little to do 
as may be about government. ‘They want information and are constantly liable to be 
misled’.
13
 Eldridge Gerry from the Massachusetts delegation ‘saw no value in the wishes of 
the public and blamed the problems of the convention on it’. ‘The evils we experience flow 
from an excess of democracy’. The people, he believed, ‘do not want virtue, but are the 
dupes of pretended patriots’.
14
 
                                       The major issue of conflict turned out to be the question if the Senate 
had to be composed on the basis of proportionality or, as had been the case until then, the 
equality of all States should be expressed, just as the convention itself did not distinguish 
between the States. The diverging of opinions was a fact: the largest States - Virginia, 
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 Merrill D. Peterson (ed), The Political Writings of Thomas Jefferson, (Charlottesville 1993) (Letter to John 
Adams, Paris, August 30, 1787). 
11
 Farrand, The Framing, 40-41. 
12
 Hunt & Scott, The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, Session of Tuesday March 29, 1787, 23-26. 
13
 Ibidem, Session of Thursday March 31, 1787, 32. 
14
 Ibidem, Session of Thursday, March 31, 1787, 31-32.  
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Pennsylvania and Massachusetts - wanted proportionality as the Virginia Plan advocated; the 
small States - Delaware, Connecticut and New Jersey - wanted equality as was proposed by 
William Paterson of the New Jersey delegation as a response to Randolph’s plan. Paterson’s 
New Jersey Plan, which actually were nine amendments on the Articles of Confederation, 
left room for just one legislature, chosen by the States. 
                                       Within a couple of days the plan was killed, with James Wilson and 
Virginian James Madison as its executioners. Wilson, who in his own State of Pennsylvania 
had to deal with a unicameral representation warned against ‘legislative despotism’. 
Without the limitation of the authority of the legislator there would not be room for liberty 
or stability. In a unicameral representation, Wilson said, one would be dependent of virtue 
and common sense. Only two independent of each other operating houses would make an 
efficient supervision possible.
15
 
                                       In a long speech Madison rejected the New Jersey Plan and drew a 
picture of the future, which sympathizers in the two centuries that followed considered to 
be prophetic. The plan would not solve the problems of the States struggling with good and 
solid government. But, he told New Jersey, you should consider that the United States will 
extend to the West and new States will be created with few people. As long as their 
contribution to decision making would be on the basis of proportionality no problems 
occurred. But once, as the New Jersey Plan intended, those States got equal representation, 
an even smaller minority than in 1787 would impose its will on the rest of the country.
16
 
Seven delegations after this speech made a choice in favor of the Virginia Plan, only New 
York and Delaware took sides with New Jersey and Maryland voted divided. 
                                       Alexander Hamilton, who neither agreed with the Virginia Plan nor the 
New Jersey Plan, introduced a plan of his own, an unusual one. It assumed a strong central 
authority, gave wide powers to an Executive appointed for a lifetime term and an upper 
house designated by an electoral college. Combined with his admiration for the British 
governmental system, and his position that the people were getting tired of the excesses of 
democracy, Hamilton was soon being accused of favoring the introduction of a monarchy, 
but he denied the intention. His long speech on June 18, 1787 in which he explained his 
proposals, was politely listened to, but William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut  presented 
aptly the lack of enthusiasm with his conclusion, that the delegate from New York was 
praised by everyone and supported by no one.
17
 Very soon after his speech Hamilton left 
Philadelphia. 
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 Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, (New York 2004), 234. 
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                                       The matter of representation, proportional or equal, could not be 
settled and developed into a deadlock between the larger and the smaller States, until the 
Connecticut delegation proposed to have the people elect the lower house on a basis of 
proportionality, and to compose a Senate on the basis of equality. This idea was not original 
or new, concluded Farrand, but it was introduced at the right moment, to get the convention 
in motion again. Madison and Wilson led the rebellion against the proposal. For whom are 
we trying to create a government, the latter asked, for the people or something imaginary 
like States.  And Madison disputed the sovereignty of the States. They are nothing more than 
corporations, obliged to execute what the central government asks them to do, he 
concluded.
18
 
                                       It was of no avail. As historian Robert Middlekauff stated: ‘The 
knowledge of history in Madison´s arguments is impressive, his logic is impeccable, and his 
failure to convince small State delegates completely understandable. The large States were 
simply asking too much… ‘ That concerned especially the assurances towards the States that 
their rights and boundaries would be respected. “Logic, history, reason were weak weapons 
in a struggle against local feeling, especially when that feeling had a long history of its 
own.”
19
 
                                       With the votes of the three large States and the three Southern States 
North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia the lower house got its proportional 
representation, but the votes were equally divided on the upper house: five for equality, five 
against with Georgia divided in its own delegation. New Hampshire had not been present in 
Philadelphia until then for budgetary reasons. New Jersey proposed to ask the delegation 
from Concord to come with haste, undoubtedly expecting small New Hampshire to join the 
small States. The other delegates saw right through this opportunism and prevented the call. 
The convention was in a serious deadlock and emotions started to run high.  Accusations of 
‘dictatorial behavior’ were made. Gunning Bedford from Delaware warned that ‘foreign 
forces’ would be called in for help by the small States if their wishes would be neglected, a 
threat he later would revoke.
20
  
                                       Pennsylvania Gouverneur Morris stated that if reason could not bring a 
solution, ‘the sword’ would have to do it. Nathaniel Gorham from Massachusetts, whom 
Madison in his earlier notes had called a man of common sense and good manners, added 
fuel to the flames by suggesting that Pennsylvania should annex Delaware and New Jersey 
should be split up between Pennsylvania and New York. These were the nightmare scenarios 
about power abuse the small States wanted to prevent with their equal representation. 
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 Hunt & Scott, The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, Session of Saturday, June 30, 1787, 192-194. 
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Hugh Williamson from the North Carolina delegation called the threats the most 
objectionable proposals he heard in the convention. There are no excuses for what Morris 
and Gorham said, was Madison’s resigned comment.
21
 
                                       On Monday July 16, 1787 the Convention voted for the last time on the 
issue. New York was not present. Five States cast their votes in favor of equal representation 
in the Senate: Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland and, quite surprisingly, North 
Carolina. Four States were against: Virginia, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Georgia. The 
third of the large States, Massachusetts was divided to the bone: two delegates for, two 
against and Gorham was one of the latter duo. After the vote some States, Massachusetts 
among them, tried to make up a compromise. It seemed like an act of desperation, for the 
small States as a bloc remained dedicated to equal representation. Next morning 
representatives of the large States, joined by some delegates from the small ones, sat in 
conclave to consider the situation. ‘The time was wasted in vague conversation on the 
subject, without any specific proposition or agreement’, Madison testily remarked.
22
 
                                       The delegates had to decide if they would take their loss and continue 
with the Convention or would leave, now that one of the pillars of the Virginia Plan was 
being removed. The delegations chose the first option. Gouverneur Morris would later 
declare that in that phase of the debates, the future of the United States hung by a thread.
23
 
After the vote on the Great Compromise the subject of the system of representation was not 
brought up again until at the end of the Convention. Gouverneur Morris formulated the 
rules for amending the Constitution. He tabled a motion which, within Article V, would 
function as a guarantee engraved in stone to the small States: ‘no State without its Consent, 
shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate’. 
                                       One of the rules agreed on at the beginning of the Convention was that 
nothing debated would be published or otherwise communicated without permission.
24
 So 
happened, until just after the crucial and potential breaking point in July, 1787. A number of 
newspapers had a short impression of the debates. ‘So great is the unanimity, we hear, that 
prevails in the Convention, upon all great federal subjects, that it has been proposed to call 
the room in which they assemble Unanimity Hall.’
25
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25
 The New York Times, September 20, 1987.  
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                                       In an early stage of the Convention the decision was made to have the 
members of the upper house appointed by the legislative assemblies of the States. It was no 
coincidence that the proposal was made by the most influential representative of Delaware, 
John Dickinson, who was supported by Roger Sherman (Connecticut). Both delegates from 
small States were skeptical about a strong central government in this phase of the debates, 
because that government would be dominated by the great States at the expense of the 
authority of the other States. Two ways of selecting the Senate – as the upper house soon 
was being called – were eliminated as being too extreme. The suggestion to have the 
Senators appointed by the Executive for a lifetime period sounded too much like a royal 
prerogative and a direct election by the people, as James Wilson proposed, would be too 
democratic.  
                                       That left two options: the first one was election by the lower house, 
chosen by the people according to the Virginian Plan and the second one was election by the 
legislatures of the States. The latter had been proposed as an alteration to the Virginia Plan 
by one of the North Carolina delegates at the start of the Convention. But the debate got 
bogged down in the question how many members the States should elect:  fifty, eighty, a 
hundred? The Virginia Plan wanted a representation on the base of the State population. 
Should the smallest State Delaware get just one Senator, the other twelve States combined 
would have the possibility to send fifty Senators at the least. This calculation assumed a 
limited federal unity of thirteen States and not even an extension with an unknown number 
of new States. This was considered an unpractical solution and North Carolina withdrew the 
idea.
26
 
                                       With the Dickinson resolution the election of the Senate was put on 
the agenda again. The Delawarean had two reasons for his proposal: through their 
government the States were better equipped to ventilate their opinions than voters would 
be able to do directly; and State Legislatures were in a better position to select men of great 
authority, who already earned their place in society and had sufficient property. Dickinson 
wanted a Senate exactly the same as the British House of Lords. Size was not a problem; he 
himself had eighty members in mind or twice as much for ‘the legislature of a numerous 
people ought to be a numerous body’.
27
 At the end of the debate in the preparatory 
committee two possibilities were put to a vote. For the last time Wilson proposed election 
by the people, but this idea was rejected with just the Pennsylvanian votes in favor.  In the 
end nine of the eleven delegations present agreed with the selection of the Senators by the 
State Legislatures. Important though was the opposition of the two largest states, 
Pennsylvania and Virginia. 
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                                       In his Federalist 62, published three quarters of a year after the 
Convention, James Madison saw hardly any reason to explain why the Framers preferred to 
leave choosing the Senate up to the Legislators from the States. It was ‘probably the most 
congenial with the public opinion’.
28
 Madison repeated the view the Convention thought 
most relevant, that in this way a tight bond would be created and continued between the 
State and the federal government. It is no surprise that Madison accepted the role of the 
State Legislature as crucial and obvious. All delegates in Philadelphia came from a 
Confederate  system. About ten of them had been a member of one of the Continental 
Congresses, composed of State Representatives. Legislatures were in high regard, especially 
the upper house or Senate of the State. Some delegates hardly disguised their intent to 
leave the choice up to the State Senate in order to avoid the whims of ‘the people’.
29
 
                                       Ten years earlier John Adams wrote about the need of the leaders of 
the American Revolution for a genuine or pseudo political aristocracy. He summed up the 
qualities members of a Senate should possess: wisdom, insight, knowledge of history and 
human behavior, contemplation and being well-informed. In this way they would be able to 
correct the ‘well intended but often reckless actions of the people’.
30
 Wise and educated 
men would thus find a balance between ruler and people. It was a plea for a forceful and 
independent upper house, chosen  at regular times.  
                                       When after the Declaration of Independence the new States abolished 
their colonial councils and founded new institutions, almost all of them opted for a 
bicameral system. So the interests of the people and of the elite would best be guaranteed. 
Pennsylvania chose a unicameral system, but revoked it in 1790. The status of the Senate 
differed State by State. In Virginia it was chosen by the people. Thomas Jefferson, a Virginian 
himself, had a premonition this did not deliver the best results. He rather preferred the 
election of the Senate by the House of Delegates, as the lower house was called in his 
commonwealth. He could live with a lifetime membership of the Senate, as long as the vote 
was being kept from the people.
31
 In Maryland the Senate had a very aristocratic character 
and was especially meant to safeguard the interests of the property owning elite. The results 
of this construction were major conflicts between the various communities , more than 
elsewhere in the Confederacy.
32
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                                       More than ten years later the Senate had proven to be a useful 
instrument in a democracy. Historian Jackson Turner Main concluded that Senators were not 
just there for the property owners, with the exception of Maryland. The American people 
had become familiar with the idea of two institutions of representation. One, the upper 
house, would check the other, the lower house.
33
 So the Convention in Philadelphia felt very 
comfortable to leave the election of the national Senate to the State Legislatures.  
                                       Though members of the national Senate were supposed to be men of 
wisdom and knowledge, the newly framed Constitution had only a few specific demands for 
the membership. A Senator had to be at least thirty years of age, and would have to be an 
American citizen for nine years. Thirdly he should be an inhabitant of the state for which he 
was chosen.
34
 The differentiation with the requirements for a member of the House of 
Representatives, who should be 25 years of age and a citizen for seven years, was explained 
by James Madison.
35
 The Senatorial trust required a greater extent of information and 
stability of character. It required at the same time that the Senator should have reached a 
period of life most likely to supply these advantages. And, given the power of the Senate to 
approve or reject treaties with foreign nations, it ought to be exercised by none, who are not 
thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and 
education. The term of nine years, Madison stated, appeared to be a prudent mediocrity 
between a total exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merits and talents might claim a share 
in the public confidence, and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of them, which might 
create a channel for foreign influence on the national councils.
36
 
                                       Concerning the procedure the State Legislatures had to follow the 
Constitution proclaimed: ‘The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators 
and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 
Congress may, at any time, by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of 
choosing Senators’.
37
 Congress did not use this privilege until 1866. Still, a number of States 
considered the clause an infringement on their rights. After the debates in the State 
Conventions on the ratification of the Constitution at least five States had such major 
objections to the clause that they proposed amendments to have it eliminated.
38
 Framers, 
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like James Madison, who were questioned about it, mentioned a variety of reasons for the 
clause. A common denominator was the fear that the national Senate could lose control of 
its own functioning by obstructive actions of the State Legislatures, like refusing to send 
Senators to Washington. In the end the first Congress left Article I, Section IV intact. 
                                       For several decades after 1789 this method sufficed. Anomalies were 
an exception. One of those was the election of a New York Senator to the First United States 
Congress. The New York State Legislature was unable to pick both their Senators until July, 
1789 almost five months after the Congress convened, due to late ratification of the 
Constitution. The First Congress had no divisions on party lines, Senators and 
Representatives were either Pro-Administration or Anti. In the State of New York the choice 
for Senators was complicated by a family feud between two powerful dynasties, the 
Livingstones and the Schuylers. The Livingstones wanted one of their own, Mayor of New 
York and son-in-law James Deane, appointed. The Schuylers also pushed one of their own 
forward, family father and general in the American Revolution Philip J. Schuyler, who was 
picked by the New York State Legislature. To frustrate the Livingstones’ ambitions Alexander 
Hamilton, son-in-law of Schuyler, asked Rufus King, a Massachusetts Framer and failed 
candidate for the Senate, to move to New York and give it another try for its still open 
Senate seat. With discrete, but influential help of the Schuylers King was appointed. 
                                       The States regulated the election of the Senators, mostly through State 
constitutions, as suited them best. In most cases the two houses of the Legislature chose the 
Senators by concurrent votes in separate sessions. Later on about half of the States made 
the choice through a joint session.
39
 One of the disadvantages of concurrent votes was that, 
due to different compositions of both houses,  deadlocks could occur. In the 27
th
 Congress 
(1841-1843) Tennessee failed to occupy one of its Senate seats, after the State Legislature 
refused to convene to elect a Senator. And Maine Senator William P. Fessenden lost an early 
opportunity to go to Washington because the lower house in his State refused to concur 
after the Maine Senate elected him eighteen times. This happened during one single session 
of the State Legislature.
40
 
                                       The first decades the House of Representatives was held in higher 
regard than the Senate.
41
 Part of it could be attributed to procedure; all meetings of the 
Senate were held behind closed doors until 1794, and after that, until 1929, all meetings, 
that dealt with matters of national security and impeachments. Even more important for the 
prestige was the fact that the House debated on issues that concerned the national interest 
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of the United States
42
 and the daily life of the American citizen; the business of the Senate 
was mainly advise and consent on affairs of the Executive Branch. Press coverage of the 
meetings of the House was about twenty times larger than on the sessions of the Senate in 
the first two decades of Congress. After his election to the Senate in 1804, former New York 
Representative Samuel Mitchill warned his wife: ‘Henceforward you will read little of me in 
the Gazettes. Senators are less exposed to public view than Representatives’.
43
 This 
difference shrunk to four to one in the following two decades. 
                                       After this early period the prestige of the Senate rose and its 
performance became superior, not the least due to the appearance amongst its midst of 
great orators like John Calhoun, Henry Clay, Thomas Hart Benton and Daniel Webster and 
soon-to-be Presidents like Andrew Jackson, Martin van Buren and Franklin Pierce. This rise in 
prestige was reflected in a note by Alexis de Tocqueville in his Democracy in America: ‘There 
is scarcely a man to be seen whose name does not recall some recent claim to fame. They 
are eloquent advocates, distinguished generals, wise magistrates, and noted statesmen. 
Every word uttered in this assembly would add luster to the greater parliamentary debaters 
in Europe.’
44
      
                                       The first time an election was contested was in 1828 when Ephraim 
Bateman of New Jersey cast the deciding vote in the State Legislature to elect himself to the 
Senate. Several members of the New Jersey Legislature challenged the legality of the 
election, but the Senate saw no reason to deny Bateman his seat, since the procedure was 
correctly followed. The Senate refused to address the question if it was appropriate to vote 
for oneself in this extraordinary situation.
45
 Almost thirty years later the Iowa State 
Legislature elected James Harlan as a United States Senator in a joint session, with a majority 
of the lower house present, but not a majority of the State Senate. Harlan was seated, but 
the decision was contested and the Judiciary Committee recommended to declare the seat 
vacant. After a heated and partisan debate the Senate did so.
46
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                                       The Harlan case demonstrated the need for some clarifying ruling on 
behalf of Congress concerning the correct procedure in the States for the election of United 
States Senators. This became all the more urgent with the election case of John P. Stockton 
of New Jersey to the Senate in 1866. Stockton was chosen by a plurality of the joint session 
of the New Jersey State Legislature, after that same session decided to change the rules. 
Opponents protested that such a change required the approval of a majority of both houses, 
which was not present at the time. The Judiciary Committee recommended the seating of 
Stockton, since no irregularities were proven. The Senate accepted the recommendation 
with Stockton himself casting the deciding vote. After heated debates the Senate 
reconsidered and unseated the New Jersey Senator. Stockton, in the meantime, had made 
up a list of the procedures in all the States and it showed a clear inconsistency.
47
 
                                       This led to a law, that same year, by Congress to regulate the times and 
manner for holding Senate elections. The bill provided that on the second Tuesday after the 
meeting and organization of a State Legislature, when a Senator is to be elected, both 
houses would meet separately and vote viva voce, that is by word of mouth, on a candidate. 
If the next day, in a joint session, it was clear that a majority in both houses cast a vote for 
the same person, this would be the United States Senator. Otherwise the joint assembly 
would meet at noon each succeeding day during the session of the Legislature and vote at 
least once until a Senator would be elected.
48
 Advocates of the law stressed the fact that in 
the public interest each State should be fully represented in the Senate and therefore some 
uniform system of election was needed. 
                                       Some Senators considered the measure ‘a deplorable interference’ in 
State affairs, where no inconvenience in the past had called for any such regulation.
49
 Others 
differed on matters of detail like: should the vote take place by viva voce or in a secret 
ballot, in order to avoid putting Legislators under restraints from party discipline. Originally 
the bill asked that assemblies would continue to vote ‘without interruption by other 
business’, until a Senator was elected. This led to vigorous protests by Senators who feared 
that, with this power to block all State legislation at its command, a small factional minority 
would hold out, until it forced the majority to yield to its demands. Others thought that a 
penalty was fit for a failing State Legislature, but in the end practical council prevailed and 
the bill was amended to at least one vote a day.
50
 A motion to have the bill postponed 
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indefinitely was rejected, the Senate passed the measure by a vote of 25 to 11 and the 
House of Representatives did likewise without debate. 
                                       Representation in the national government, John Dickinson of 
Delaware presented as one of the arguments in support of election by the State Legislatures, 
would be the best method to preserve the power of the State governments. ‘If the State 
governments were excluded from all agency in the national one, and all power drawn from 
the people at large,’ the Delawarean  delegate to the Constitutional Convention declared, 
‘the consequence would be that the national government would move in the same direction 
as the state governments now do, and would run into all the same mischiefs’.
51
 
                                       The Constitution itself did not provide many tools for the State to 
control their national Senators after they were elected. There was no right to instruct as was 
the case in the colonies, nor had the State Legislature the right to recall. Not in any way 
could the States ensure that their interests would be looked after by the Senators, who 
could only be punished for their lack of efforts after six years, when the Senator was to be 
re-elected. State Legislators were elected for a period of four years to the most and more 
often just two years or one. A considerable number of Legislators chose not to run again for 
office or were not re-elected, so a completely different group of State Legislators with a new 
agenda was around come the time of the Senators’ re-election.  
                                       The situation of interdependence between State Legislatures and the 
State’s U. S. Senators started to change in the 1830s. Prior to that time candidates for the 
Senate would canvass Legislators for their support, after they were elected to the State 
Legislatures. But now would-be Senators started to canvass the voters in order to have them 
elect Legislators, who would support them. Often this support was made public in a pledge. 
Especially in the 1830s, when the political system was disorganized, this way of gaining 
support proved to be highly effective. This method became so commonly accepted, that 
later to be United States President James Polk as Governor of Tennessee refused to fill a 
Senate vacancy because ‘the members selected to the Legislature in 1839 had not been 
chosen with the selection of Senators in view’.
52
 
                                       Canvassing for a Senate seat got national attention in the 1850s with 
the campaign of later to be Republican President Abraham Lincoln and his Democratic 
opponent Stephen Douglas, who was the incumbent Senator, in Illinois. With their debates 
and speeches both rivals for one of the Senate seats were not looking for voters, but support 
of the, almost completely renewed, lower house of the Illinois General Assembly, which was 
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disorganized and fragmented. Slavery, particularly in the newly created territories of 
Nebraska and Kansas, was the main issue. In the end Legislators, who backed Lincoln got the 
largest popular vote, but Douglas managed to get the support of a plurality of the Assembly, 
and was subsequently re-elected.
53
 Two years later Lincoln defeated Douglas in his battle for 
the American Presidency. 
                                       The 1866 election law regulated the process of choosing the members 
of the United State Senate, but it did not solve the problems and the bickering within the 
State Legislatures themselves. The law did not discourage deadlocks
54
 in the election of 
Senators or prevent vacancies in the Senate.
55
 Complicating the elections were rules or 
customs in especially the older States of the Union on the representative background of the 
Senators. This meant that Senators had to be residents of different parts of their State. 
Vermont precedent required that one Senator resided on the east side of the Green 
Mountains and one on the west side.
56
 Maryland had until 1896 a provision on this issue in 
statute law. One of the Senators should be an inhabitant of the eastern shore of the 
Chesapeake Bay and the other one of the western shore. This restriction had a harmful 
influence on politics in Maryland for it blocked careers of some and deterred others from 
entering politics.
57
 This provision was at least at odds with the Constitution since ‘no State by 
statute or otherwise may add qualifications for a senator not prescribed in the 
Constitution’.
58
 
                                       Even more complicating was the changed method of electing Senators 
that the 1866 law enforced upon the States. Previously some State did elect by a plurality 
vote in joint session; the new bill required a majority for an election to be valid. This and 
other requirements, that limited the elbow-room of the States to find practical solutions for 
looming situations may have multiplied the number of deadlocks.
59
 Between 1891 and 1905 
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the number was 46 and they occurred all over the United States. Nine times they lasted for 
less than ten days, fifteen times for more than fifty days, with a record of 114 days in 
Delaware. Fourteen times the deadlocks resulted in a vacant seat in the Senate. The 
situation in Delaware was notorious; five out of seven times no Senator was elected.
60
 With 
the rising numbers of deadlocks  society in general, but also Congress itself began to 
question, if the State Legislatures were still the appropriate institutions to select the United 
States Senators. So this became one of the factors in the demand for the direct election of 
the Senate.  
                                       Another problem the new election law did not prevent were the 
charges of bribery and corruption against one of their own members the Senate had to 
consider. Before 1866 this happened once, but the charge that Pennsylvania Senator Simon 
Cameron had procured his seat ‘by corrupt and unlawful means’ was ‘too vague’ for an 
investigation. In nine cases, brought before the Senate between 1872 and 1899, seven times 
the Senator under scrutiny was exonerated and the other two resigned their seat before 
actions were taken.  The 1872 case against Kansas Senator Samuel Pomeroy led Mark Twain 
and Charles Dudley Warner to model their archetypal  corrupt politician Senator Abner 
Dilworthy after him.
61
 But the most notorious case the Senate had to take care of before the 
Seventeenth Amendment was enacted, came when Senator William Lorimer of Illinois – a 
‘boss’ in his State - was expelled as corrupt. Ironically, one of his actions was buying the vote 
of a Illinois Assemblyman to get himself into the Senate. 
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Chapter Two: Rage Against The Machine 
 
                                       The Populism of the 1890s and the Progressive Movement of the 
first decade of the 20
th
 century made a major contribution to the popular support for direct 
democracy, most certainly through the advocacy of it by their representatives in politics and 
society. The direct vote for the United States Senate was the most radical reform in this 
spectrum. 
                                       For the Populists, from the early 1890s on organized in the People’s 
Party, political reform was part of a larger and comprehensive program, written down in the 
commonly known Omaha Platform. It demanded a number of radical measures on the three 
sectors of finance, transportation and land, like the public ownership of the railroads, the 
telegraphs and telephones, the free coinage of silver and the abolition of national banks, the 
prohibition of alien land ownership, a graduated income tax and an eight hours workday. 
Next to those demands, but not as part of the Platform of the People’s Party, but as 
‘Expressions of Sentiments’, the party’s  Convention of 1892 demanded a free, secret ballot - 
the so called Australian ballot system, commended the initiative and the referendum as part 
of the legislative system and favored a constitutional provision, limiting the office of 
President and Vice-President to one term, ‘and providing for the election of Senators of the 
United States by a direct vote of the people’.
62
 
                                       Though some of them modified their opinion in a later stage, most 
early Progressives took a very negative attitude towards the Populists. William Allen White’s 
What’s the Matter with Kansas?, a lengthy editorial in the Kansan newspaper The Emporia 
Gazette was telling and established the young editor’s name nationwide. After White drew a 
worrying picture about the diminished population, wealth and standing of his State – ‘She 
has traded places with Arkansas and Timbuctoo’- he asked the question ‘What’s the Matter 
with Kansas?’. His vitriolic wrath concerned Populist leaders in the state. 
‘We have an old mossback Jacksonian who snorts 
and howls because there is a bathtub in the State 
House; we are running that old jay for governor. We 
have another shabby, wild-eyed, rattle-brained 
fanatic who has said openly in a dozen speeches that 
‘the rights of the user are paramount to the rights of 
the owner’; we are running him for Chief Justice, so 
that capital will come tumbling over itself to get into 
the state. We have raked the old ash heap of failure 
in the state and found an old human hoop skirt who 
has failed as a businessman, who has failed as an 
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editor, who has failed as a preacher, and we are 
going to run him for Congressman-at-Large. He will 
help the looks of the Kansan delegation at 
Washington. Then we have discovered a kid without 
a law practice and have decided to run him for 
Attorney General. Then, for fear some hint that the 
state had become respectable might percolate 
through the civilized portions of the nation, we have 
decided to send three or four harpies out lecturing, 
telling the people that Kansas is raising hell and 
letting the corn go to weed.’
63
 
                                        Edward Bellamy and Henry Demarest Lloyd were the most famous 
of the authors and thinkers who inspired the general public about Populism, though the 
former was an utopian with Christian tendencies and the latter an activist who later 
converted to socialism. Their writings had great impact. In his Looking Backward Bellamy 
sketched a society in the year 2000 with a central authority and no legislatures, because 99 
percent of laws were not needed. There was no selling and no buying, just distribution of 
goods, no waste or crime and retirement was at the age of 45.
64
 The book was one of the 
best read around 1890. 
                                       Another envisioned major change with 1887 is the disappearance of all 
traditional parties and the emergence of a national party, which ‘probably took that name 
because its aim was to nationalize the functions of production and distribution’. It was ‘the 
most patriotic of all possible parties, it sought to justify patriotism and raise it from an 
instinct to a rational devotion, by making the native land truly a father land, a father who 
kept the people alive and was not merely an idol for which they were expected to die.’
65
 
Given the fact that the Populists emphasized to be a ‘people’s movement’ ‘nationalism’ 
became a major influence in its circles. (And later on it did so in the Progressive movement) 
                                       Henry Demarest Lloyd embedded his reputation inside the movement 
with Wealth Against Commonwealth, which gave the Populists lots of ammunition for their 
attacks on big corporations, in this case Standard Oil and its founder John D. Rockefeller. 
With it Lloyd became one of the precursors of the muckraking journalists of the first decade 
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of the 20
th
 century. It was an indictment of social Darwinism and economic liberalism and 
warned against social disintegration. It attacked the claim of monopolies that they were 
inevitable, inexpensive and efficient. Besides, Lloyd stated, did cheapness justify the ends to 
make things cheap? Society as a whole was neither to blame for Americans had fashioned 
and worshipped a golden calf after their own ideals. The book ended with a plan to 
overthrow those few who manipulated Congress, the press and schools and corrupted 
national life. ‘When capitalists combine irresistibly against the people, the government, 
which is the people’s combination, must take them in hand’.
66
 
                                       Lloyd rejected the idea of Populism as the organized discontent of the 
people. ‘It is the organized aspiration of the people for a fuller, nobler, richer, kindlier life for 
every man, woman, and child in the ranks of humanity.’ And it was an uprising of principles, 
of which one was that the public should have the right to use public powers for the public 
welfare to any extent the public demanded, and the other was that no public powers or 
property should be used for private profit. The last principle would forver put an end ‘to all 
land grants, charters of railroads and banks, gifts of public streets to profit-seeking gas, 
telephone, street railway syndicates…’
67
  
                                       The People’s Party emerged from a number of farmers organizations, 
with the National Farmers’ Alliance, which stronghold laid in the Northwest, and the 
National Farmers’ Alliance and Industrial Union, which was strong in the South, as the 
dominant ones. They were joined in 1892, when the party was just founded, by various 
groups like prohibitionists, advocates of a single (land) tax, nationalists, socialists and 
laborers. All shared a number of grievances like the corruption of politics, the oppressing and 
exploiting power of monopolies and banks and unemployment. The groups were strictly 
nonpartisan, albeit not non-political, for the solution for the grievances laid, partly at least, 
in legislation. For a time the opinion was dominant that people should try to achieve their 
goals through existing political parties, but reality proved that representatives chosen in the 
Legislature or Congress bowed before the demands of the party machine. 
                                       By 1890 Alliance conventions in the Northwest nominated candidates 
for local Councils, State Legislatures and Congress and showed success, first of all in Kansas 
and Nebraska. Southern farmers focused on taking over the Democratic party machines and 
did very well. Thomas Watson and a handful of other Alliance Democrats from Georgia and 
South Carolina were elected as Congressmen. This stimulated the urge for a national third 
party. The reluctance in the South Alliance was substantial, because the capture of the 
Democratic party was a real possibility and a breakup of the Southern one-party system on 
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behalf of the participation in a third party would result in a heavy loss of membership and 
prestige.
68
 After a couple of conventions and the drafting of six fundamental principles, the 
People’s Party was formed. The first duty of a national convention was to name a 
presidential ticket. On Election Day 1892 the ticket with James B. Weaver gained 1,027,329 
votes and got 22 electoral votes from six Northwestern States. 
                                       After the successes of Populist candidates in the 1890 and 1892 
elections for Congress ‘Fusion’ made its entrance, a close cooperation with one of the two 
major parties for maximum electoral gain. Since in the Northwest the Republicans were the 
main rivals of the Populists, it meant ‘fusion’ with Democratic machines. But in the South, 
where the Populists were in a bitter struggle with de Democratic machines, the Republicans 
were the obvious partner for cooperation. It worked out well as long as fusion could be kept 
local or regional. By combining Populists and Republicans, farmers’ leader Marion Butler 
swept his party to unprecedented success in North Carolina, not only at State level, but also 
in the United States Congress delegation. And elsewhere in the South the Populists 
flourished by the cooperation with the Republicans. Since voters in the Northwest were in 
masses returning to the Republican party, Populists desperately needed an issue for a 
successful fusion with the Democrats. That seemed to be the free coinage of silver, an 
important demand in the mining and farming States. And it worked; two years later Populists 
were returned with 15 Congressional seats.
69
 
                                       Fusion became a major source of dissension at a national level, when 
the People’s Party had to make up its mind about the presidential election. The Democrats 
had, surprisingly, chosen 36-year old William Jennings Bryan, a former Congressman from 
Nebraska, as their candidate for the White House. Since Bryan, through his celebrated Cross 
of Gold speech, had made free silver a cornerstone of his campaign, and also otherwise 
usurped Populist reform ideas, the People’s Party leadership found itself faced with a 
dilemma: should it field a Populist presidential ticket at the risk of helping the Republicans 
win the election or should it ally itself with Bryan? 
                                       It split the fusionists, who favored the latter option and the middle-of-
the-roaders, who wanted the party to keep its independent course. Marching with the 
Democrats was hard to swallow for the Southern Populists, since they were their arch-
enemies. The People’s Party chose to support Bryan for the presidency, but, as a concession 
to their Southern members, took Thomas Watson – still the most prominent Populist in the 
region – as the vice-presidential candidate. 
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                                       Bryan lost the election and the aftermath proved to be fatally 
detrimental to the Populists. The North Carolina fusion collapsed and its architect Marion 
Butler became a Republican. So did other Populists in the South after the Democrats started 
their campaign of black disfranchisement. But Thomas Watson, who, as an early Populist, 
advocated close cooperation between blacks and poor whites, went back to the Democrats 
and became a convinced believer in white supremacy. In the Northwest Populists hung on to 
pockets of supporters until, in 1902, they disappeared altogether from Congress. 
                                       The verdict on the Populist movement and the People’s Party as 
reform-minded and progressive or backward-looking and conspiracy-minded is still out 
among historians. Frederick Jackson Turner, a Progressive, was the first historian with an 
opinion about Populism. He compared the agitation of the Populists with earlier clashes 
between frontier communities and financial institutions. ‘Many a State that now declines 
any connection with the tenets of the Populists, itself adhered to such ideas in an earlier 
stage of the development of the State. A primitive society can hardly be expected to show 
the intelligent appreciation of the complexity of business interests in a developed society.’
70
 
Later on Turner would add that ‘taken as whole, Populism is a manifestation of the old 
pioneer ideals of the native American, with the added element of increasing readiness to 
utilize the national government to effect its ends’.
71
 
                                       Almost forty years after Turner’s first essay on the subject  John D. 
Hicks, a student of his, concluded in his, at least at that time, comprehensive study on 
Populism that  the movement was a manifestation of interest group politics and a revolt 
against economic hardship and those held responsible:  the manufacturers, the railroads, the 
money-lenders, the middlemen – plutocrats all. It was a democratic revolt of the Frontier 
and the West against the City and the East.
72
 
                                       Most influential, but also most controversial and fiercely contested 
was Richard Hofstadter’s opinion about the Populists. He considered them nostalgic, 
backward-looking petty capitalists. They were provincial, conspiracy-minded and looking for 
scapegoats. The latter manifested itself in nativism, anti-intellectualism, Anglophobia and, 
most of all, anti-Semitism. That last charge was essentially based on remarks by Populist 
leader Ignatius Donnelly on the Rothschilds and phrases in Donnelly’s books The Golden 
Bottle and Caesar’s Column and on Thomas Watson’s anti-Semitism in later life.
73
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Hofstadter ‘s revisionist view was vehemently criticized by New Left historian Norman 
Pollack. He called it selective and leading and inadequate, for example when Hofstadter 
stated that ‘though they did not express themselves in such terms’ Populists were backward-
looking, because they wanted ‘to restore the conditions prevailing before the development 
of industrialism and the commercialization of agriculture’.
74
 About the accusation of anti-
Semitism Pollack stated there was less, not more, of it in the movement than in the rest of 
society. The Populists were forward-looking, class oriented and they accepted 
industrialization, said Pollack. And about the charge of socialism, some of the Populist were 
socialist, but most were followers of Bellamy.
75
  
                                       C. Vann Woodward was a less boisterous critic of Hofstadter, but he 
nevertheless disagreed fundamentally with him on the motives of the Populists. The 
biographer of Thomas Watson
76
 and close friend of Hofstadter, argued that the new view of 
Populism, as was aired in The Age of Reform, was fundamentally a-historical, a deductive 
interpretation, based on contemporary concerns, that ignored the historical realities of the 
Populist insurgency, especially in the South. Those concerns were linked to McCarthyism. 
Woodward, who within the context of his Origins of the New South, studied Southern 
Populism in particular, concluded that Populists challenged the ‘New South romanticism’ of 
Reconciliation of South and North and White Solidarity, as was reflected in the one-party 
system. They sought an understanding with Southern blacks upon  the popular theory that 
‘self-interest always controls’.
77
 Or as Tom Watson told the two races, contending that ‘the 
accident of color can make no difference in the interest of farmers, croppers and laborers’: 
‘You are kept apart that you may separately fleeced of your earnings’.
78
 
                                       Lawrence Goodwyn, who authored the first comprehensive work on 
Populism since John D. Hicks,
79
 explained Populism as a crusade for a ‘cooperative 
commonwealth’ against the emerging corporate state. This ideal was embodied in a 
‘movement culture’, a phenomenon that was derived from but also was part of the 
industrialization of America. Populism dared to pursue cultural acceptance of democratic 
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politics open to serious structural evolution of society. ‘The collapse of Populism meant, in 
effect, that the cultural values of the corporate state were politically unassailable in 
twentieth-century America’.
80
 
                                       In the philosophy of Populism the government had to restrain the 
selfish tendencies of those, who profited at the expense of the poor and the needy, and in 
order to make that possible, government had to be controlled by the people and not the 
plutocrats. Proper exercise of that control was hindered by corruption at the ballot box and 
the denial of a fair count. Next to aiming for a secret ‘Australian’ ballot the Populists made 
out a case for measures, that would insure a true expression of the will of the people. So 
they sought to eliminate indirect elections, especially those of United States Senators and 
the President and Vice-President by an Electoral College. Aware that party bosses used to 
manipulate nominating conventions they favored direct primary elections. Women suffrage 
could not be denied a place among reforms because it was in line with the doctrine of 
popular rule. To force State Legislatures to enact reforms people should have the right of 
initiative, referendum and recall.
81
 
                                       Control of government by the people should be a means to an end, 
being the power of the government to check the iniquities of the plutocrats. All this should 
be part of a system of radical reforms. As the subtitle said of Thomas Watson’s People’s 
Party Campaign Book:  ‘Not a Revolt; It is a Revolution’. 
                                       James Weaver, their 1892 presidential candidate expressed the deep 
mistrust of the Populists in the quality and integrity of the Senate with the conclusion – from 
the experience of thirty years – that men of wealth would be more likely to be selected for 
the Senate by State Legislatures than by the people themselves. Under the, at that time, 
customary method of selecting it was an easy matter for an unscrupulous man of wealth to 
secure the position. When elected it was extremely difficult to replace him. He also charged 
that many Senators were annually retained by corporations and other moneyed interests 
and such things were ‘incompatible with the faithful discharge of public duty’.  In a somber 
mood he concluded that there was not a single great leader in the Senate of that day, not 
one who was abreast of the times, or who could be truthfully said to be the exponent of 
American civilization or the active champion of the reforms made necessary by the growth 
an changed relations of a century, and which were struggling for recognition.
82
 
                                       Almost simultaneously with the Populist upsurge another 
phenomenon began to manifest itself in American politics, which looked like ´fairly clear´ 
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related to the success of the Populists. It is generally accepted
83
 that the elections of 1896 
were critical elections or elections with political realignment, which, according to political 
scientist V. O. Key, meant a realignment within the electorate that was both sharp and 
durable. Maybe the midterm Congress elections of 1894, with its enormous loss of 
Democratic seats, was a foretaste of things to come, but this could also be a reaction to the 
financial policies of Democratic president Grover Cleveland. Two years earlier, at the 
presidential election, the Populists had scored 8,5 percent of the total votes and this could 
be explained as, what Walter Dean Burnham called a ‘proto realignment phenomenon’
84
 
since third parties which got more than 5 percent of the vote had been associated with 
either the initial stages of every realignment from the 1830s on or with relatively high 
tension about midway in the life cycle of an electoral era. 
                                       All the proto realignments had a ‘leftist’ orientation. They constituted 
attacks by groups who felt they were outsiders against an elite whom they frequently 
viewed in conspiratorial terms. These attacks were made in the name of democratic-
humanistic universals against an established political structure which was perceived to be 
corrupt, undemocratic, and manipulated by insiders for their and their supporters’ benefit. 
All of them were perceived as ‘movements’ which would not only purify the corruption of 
the present political regime, but replace some of its most important constituent parts. 
Moreover, they all ‘telegraphed’, as it were, the basic issue-clusters which would dominate 
politics in the next electoral era:  the struggle between metropolitan and colonial regions in 
the 1890s. All this suggests a relationship of significance between the periodic recurrence of 
third-party forerunners of realignment  - and realignments themselves – and certain 
dominant peculiarities of polity and society in the United States.
85
 
                                       A peculiar phenomenon that originated in the 1890s realignment  was 
the strong decline in voting and the diminishing party loyalty, a tendency which is 
remarkable given the public debate about political reform. Voter turnout, which was almost 
eighty percent in the 1896 presidential election went down to 48.9 percent in 1924.
86
  
                                       While Populists manifested themselves in the West and the North of 
the United States reformers in the Northeast could especially be found in the ranks of the 
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regionally powerful Republican party. The State of Massachusetts, in particular ‘conscience-
soaked Boston’, was the nest of the Mugwumps – as the reformers called themselves, 
‘young men of high aims and aspirations, prominent lawyers, clergymen, college professors, 
journalists of first-rate ability, distinguished writers and careful students of history and the 
science of government’.
87
 But the Mugwumps, who opposed ‘their’ party’s candidate for the 
1884 presidential elections, James G. Blaine, were probably an even more crucial factor in 
New York State’s politics as they, at least, helped secure the victory of Democratic candidate 
Grover Cleveland.
88
 Judged by their education, upbringing, wealth and profession they were 
as elitist as their Massachusetts brethren.
89
 
                                       The Mugwumps’ program was limited to economy in government, civil 
service reform, tariff reduction, the gold standard and honesty in politics.
90
 With their role in 
the defeat of the Northeast’s favorite son Blaine there was no place left in the Republican 
party for Mugwumps, so some of them became Independents and others turned 
ideologically to the Democrats. But Democrats were reluctant to welcome them and were 
suspicious of their reform ideas, since Mugwumps were considered conservative on 
economic issues and (too) radical on civil service reform.
91
 The 1887 Massachusetts 
Democratic State convention openly denounced civil service reform
92
 and the Irish 
controlled party machines in the years that followed, managed to render the reformers 
harmless or subjugate them into the machine, after they realized that there was no 
Democratic power without the Irish slums.
93
 
                                       Where the Mugwumps vanished, the Progressives emerged. Without 
exactly following in the footsteps of the Mugwumps, the Progressives took up a lot of their 
reform plans, and in the end with more success. From the end of the 1890s scores of 
Progressives manifested themselves, from California to New England and from Wisconsin to 
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Georgia and together represented the Progressive Era. But was there such a thing as ‘the 
Progressive movement’? There were progressive ‘goals’: the exclusion of privileged interests 
from political and economic control, the expansion of democracy and the use of government 
to benefit the weak and oppressed members of American society. There were  progressive 
‘objectives’, such as: constraints on monopolies, trusts and big banking interests; regulation 
of railroad rates; lower tariffs; the direct primary; initiative, referendum and recall; direct 
election of U. S. Senators; women’s suffrage; child- and female-labor laws; pure food and 
drug laws and conservation.
94
 But was there a ‘progressive movement’? 
                                       No, concluded historian Peter Filene. Analysis of a social movement 
begins with its goals and its values, because without them there would be no movement. 
‘Progressivism lacked unanimity of purpose either on a programmatic or on a philosophical 
level.’
95
 The identity of ‘the Progressive movement’ was doubtful and even became more so 
as historians analyzed it. There was a Progressive era, but not a ‘movement’. ‘The 
progressive era seems to be characterized by shifting coalitions around different issues, with 
the specific nature of these coalitions varying on federal, state and local levels, from region 
to region, and from the first to the second decades of the century.’
96
 History between 1890 
and 1920, Filene concluded, was ambiguous, inconsistent and moved by agents and forces 
more complex than a progressive movement.
97
 
                                       The movement may have been declared dead and buried by Filene in 
1970 but progressivism shuffled through the following decade as a corpse that would not lie 
down, as another skeptic, social historian Daniel T. Rodgers, wryly remarked.
98
 Ever since 
Benjamin Parke De Witt characterized the movement  as ‘in the minds of many, confused 
and chaotic’
99
, written opinions appeared about its ideas, motives and importance in a great 
diversity and with different appreciations. 
                                       In general, four categories can, chronologically, be made. The first 
group saw Progressives as the descendants of the Populists. It emphasized the many 
achievements of the Progressives in the domain of direct democracy, labor and public health 
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laws, financial and other economic reforms.
100
 The second group was highly critical of the 
‘movement’ and considered it not just as elitist – because it consisted of WASPs: White 
Anglo-Saxon Protestants – but also as reactionary.
101
 Progressives were participating in a 
status revolution, defending themselves against plutocrats on one side and workers and 
immigrants on the other, who threatened their middle class social position. But these 
representatives of the old urban middle class also made attempts to cure the injustices in 
American society.
102
 They became reformers, not because of economic hardship, but in 
revolt against the new corporate society, with its growth of class consciousness, where the 
individual felt threatened by big business and organized labor.
103
 Revolt against the 
industrial discipline was the central theme in Progressivism: ´the Progressive movement was 
the complaint of the unorganized against the consequences of organization´.
104
 
                                       The third group concluded that the Progressives were a movement of 
bureaucrats, who, when the American society was changing from an agrarian community to 
an industrial society, tried to find a new order. 
105
 In this search for stability, a movement of 
organization men was caught up in dreams of social efficiency, systematization, and 
scientifically adjusted harmony.
106
 It was the complaint of the organized, a bureaucratic 
revolution.
107
 Administration and management were the new values and government was 
run by experts with efficiency and an eye for business interests. Industrialism was the 
common denominator since regional groups of Progressives had different interests. The 
fourth group viewed the Progressive era as an attempt to introduce political capitalism, with 
big business as a dominant factor. Government did not  control business but the opposite 
happened.
108
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                                       Progressivism had its major ideologist in Herbert David Croly (1869-
1930), who was born and bred in New York and educated at Harvard which might explain his 
focus, as his critics observed, on urban problems and his neglect of the rural concerns. He 
tried to reconcile the thinking of Thomas Jefferson, who aimed for a strong democracy and 
Alexander Hamilton, who’s goal was a strong national government, but admitted he was, in 
the end, on the latter’s side.
109
 This puts in perspective that Croly did not work up 
enthusiasm for direct democracy reforms. He was convinced that the system of direct 
primaries would fail, because it was a ‘clumsy and mechanical device for the selection of 
party candidates’.
110
 To Croly political reform was organizational, a question of efficiency. 
Democracy had so to simplify its machinery that only decisive decisions and choices should 
be submitted to the voters. This would arouse their interests. Reformers should be more 
than perpetual protesters. ‘Reformers must make office-holding worthwhile by giving to the 
office-holders the power of effecting substantial public benefits.’
111
 
                                       Though Croly was criticized for a lack of national focus, there was a 
mutual influence with some progressive-minded politicians, especially former Republican 
President Theodore Roosevelt. Croly’s ideas about a strong, self-confident, united America, 
politically as well as military, impressed Roosevelt, although it is stated that it might have 
worked the other way around. Led by a decisive government, Croly stated,  a ‘new 
nationalism’ could battle the social and economic problems, which arose in a society that 
had changed from an agricultural to an industrial economy. ‘American government demands 
more rather than less centralization merely and precisely because of the growing 
centralization of American activity… The conception of democracy [as the opposite of 
centralization]  is the great enemy of the American national advance, and is for this reason 
the great enemy of the real interests of democracy’.
112
 
                                       In his ‘The New Nationalism’ speech in Osawatomie, Kansas, Roosevelt 
in 1910 elaborated on this theme when he said that government, national and state, had to 
be freed from the sinister influence or control of special interests. Every interest was entitled 
to justice, ‘but not one is entitled to a vote in Congress, to a voice on the bench, or to 
representation in any public office’. In a plea for national efficiency for the good of all the 
people Roosevelt asked for ‘a spirit of broad and far-reaching nationalism’. This New 
Nationalism ‘puts the national needs before sectional or personal advantage’ and it ‘regards 
the executive power as the steward of the public welfare’. The prime problem of America 
was ‘to get the right type of good citizenship, and, to get it, we must have progress, and our 
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public men must be genuinely progressive’, Roosevelt thus laid the connection to the 
reformist movement. 
                                       Roosevelt, unlike Croly, had no aversion to the direct primary, but only 
if it was legally safeguarded against corrupt practices, which would benefit unscrupulous 
candidates over more honest competitors. The President had other reforms in mind: public 
accountability of candidates for offices of campaign money, received or spent; simpler and 
freer political action; removal of unfaithful or incompetent public servants. And one of the 
fundamental necessities in a representative government was to make certain, that the men 
whom the people delegated should serve the people by whom they were elected, and not 
the special interests. ‘I believe that every national officer, elected or appointed, should be 
forbidden to perform any service or receive any compensation, directly or indirectly, from 
interstate corporations; and a similar provision could not fail to be useful within the 
states’.
113
 
                                       Seven years before Roosevelt’s speech journalists had started to 
address the same problem in a bold way that proved to be devastating for the image of 
many office-holders, locally, at a State level and, especially, nationally. The emerging of mass 
magazines like McClure’s laid the foundation for a new kind of journalism, not subservient to 
political parties, but independently unveiling abuses, scandals and corrupt practices, mainly 
in business and politics. The works of the journalists were so annoying to the establishment, 
that even a Progressive-minded politician like president Theodore Roosevelt got irritated 
and invented the term ‘Muckrakers’, though he never explicitly put the label on investigative 
journalists as such. 
                                       In a speech on April 15, 1906, at the dedication of the United States 
House of Representatives Office Building, he went back for it to Pilgrim’s Progress, an 
allegory by 17
th
 century English preacher John Bunyan. Referring to one of the characters in 
the book Roosevelt said: ‘You may recall the description of the Man with the Muck Rake, the 
man who could look no way but downward, with the muck rake in his hand; who was 
offered a celestial crown for his muck rake, but who would neither look up nor regard the 
crown he was offered, but continued to rake to himself the filth of the floor’
114
. Investigative 
journalism accepted the mark as an honorary title, though some journalists did it a bit 
reluctantly or even with aversion. 
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                                       Every one of the investigating journalists had her or his own niche at 
McClure´s. Ida Tarbell devoted her attention to the practice of the oil industry, especially the 
Standard Oil Corporation, Ray Stannard Baker wrote about coal mining conditions, coal 
strikes and the position of non-striking  workers, Lincoln Steffens was the expert on 
corruption in the cities and, later on, the States and David Graham Phillips dug, writing for 
William Randolph Hearst´s newly acquired Cosmopolitan, into the actions of United States 
Senators. Especially Steffens and Phillips were very effective in making the population ripe 
for reform. Steffens started with a series of articles on political and governmental abuses in 
cities like St. Louis, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh and Philadelphia
115
 and followed that up with ´an 
attempt to trace American political corruption to its sources in six States of the United 
States´, with a particular strong verdict on New Jersey as a traitor State.
116
 
                                       Phillips lambasted the misdeeds and corrupt practices of about twenty 
members of the upper house in his series The Treason of the Senate. Most scorn concerned 
prominent East Coast Republicans, but he also wrote articles on powerful Democrats, often 
leading figures in their own Senatorial ranks. Phillips especially targeted the Republican 
powerbroker Nelson Aldrich,  five-term Senator for Rhode Island, chairman of the Finance 
Committee, factional Republican leader in the Senate and father-in-law of John D. 
Rockefeller junior. Aldrich, according to Phillips, was a very useful agent of ´the interests´.  
                                       In spite of the impact of the revealing articles muckraking in all 
likelyhood was not supposed to be the core business of the mass magazines. The muckraking 
articles, in any case, took up only a small part of the total space. It is doubtful if even the 
four most well-known muckrakers planned their career in this mold. Ida Tarbell started her 
work for McClure´s with series on Napoleon Bonaparte and Abraham Lincoln. When the idea 
was suggested to publish a number of articles on ´the greatest American business 
achievements´ Standard Oil was mentioned as the subject, since it was the Mother of Trusts. 
Since Miss Tarbell grew up in the oil region of Pennsylvania and had seen ´the marvelous 
development of the Standard Oil Trust at first hand´ she was the obvious choice to write 
them. Miss Tarbell worked for three years on the subject, with full cooperation of the 
company.
117
 She had hoped her inquiry might be received as a legitimate historical study, 
but ´to my chagrin I found myself included in a new school, that of the muckrakers´. Later on 
she started to regret her line of work  and became a eulogist of business.
118
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                                       Ray Stannard Baker was a writer of secret-service stories and a 
novelist, before he went on to muckraking. And Lincoln Steffens, perhaps the most 
passionate muckraker at McClure´s was supposed to become a desk editor. To let him 
become acquainted with the way magazine staff writers did their work S. S. McClure sent 
him on a roving mission, which brought him first of all in St. Louis, Missouri, where he 
learned about corruption.
119
 
                                       The origin of what was later called the ´muckraking movement´ was 
accidental, S. S. McClure wrote in his autobiography a few years later , and it came from no 
formulated plan to attack existing institutions.
120
 This can not be said of David Graham 
Phillips, who was writing novels for the Saturday Evening Post, when the editor of 
Cosmopolitan talked him into writing the attack on the Senate.
121
 William Randolph Hearst, 
the owner of Cosmopolitan, had to get even with the East Coast political elite, who wanted 
to derail his political career. Steffens, after having left McClure´s for The American Magazine 
wrote a scathing judgment on Hearst and called him an autocratic plutocrat whose motives 
were political and so ´mister Hearst does not personify the new American spirit´.
122
 This was 
in line with the observation of Herbert Croly, who wrote: ‘Mr. Hearst, in his own opinion the 
only immaculate reformer, is, in the eyes of his fellow-reformers, as dangerous a public 
enemy as the most corrupt politician or the most unscrupulous millionaire.’
123
   
                                       To one particular American community disaster served as a wake up 
call and convinced it of the urgency of reform. Until, in September 1900, one-third of the 
Texan island City of Galveston was destroyed by a tidal wave and at least 6000 inhabitants 
perished it was one of the worst-governed urban communities in the whole country.  Under 
the system of a mayor, a board of aldermen and various elected officials Galveston was in 
debt, departments wasted money, rates were high and services were poor.
124
 After the 
disaster, some citizens, fearing for bankruptcy asked the State of Texas to hand over the 
powers of city government to a commission of five businessmen. The governor appointed 
three of them and the other two were elected by the voters. Since the governors 
appointments were at odds with the Texan constitution provisions were made that the three 
appointees stood for election and they too got the support of the Galveston voters. 
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                                       This experiment, soon to be known as the Galveston Plan, was 
intended as temporary, but proved to be tremendously successful in getting the city on its 
feet again. So the conviction settled that commission government was a good institution, 
other Texan cities followed and in a few years it was common practice all over the state. Des 
Moines, the State capital of Iowa, was the first outside of Texas to adopt the commission 
system, but incorporated other reforms like the initiative, the referendum and the recall as 
well.This should keep city officials in line with the voters. 
                                       About the same time, in 1908, the Virginian city of Staunton was the 
first to implement another form of government: a city-manager, which even more met the 
bureaucratic ideal. The city council or the commission served as a board of directors with an 
appointed city manager as the (chief) executive. Where the members of the council or the 
commission usually were politicians, the city-manager was a professional, just like in the 
world of business.
125
 But he remained an appointee, as the city manager of Phoenix, Arizona 
found out when he was dismissed in 1915 by the city commissioners for incompetence, 
extravagance and inefficiency.
126
 By 1916 nearly eighty municipalities had a city-manager,  a 
majority with less than 10,000 inhabitants and Dayton, Ohio being the largest.
127128
 
                                       The system of local government  in  the United States was an 
inheritance from England and in structure remained the same after the Revolution. The 
municipality was run by a mayor, appointed by the governor, plus elected aldermen and 
councilmen. Powers and privileges were laid down in municipal charters, just like in colonial 
times, but in 1791 the first United States Congress handed this authority over to the States 
Legislatures as a consequence of the Tenth Amendment.
129
 This was when only the five 
largest towns of the United States had a population of over 10,000; a century later the 
largest three were counted as having more than a million inhabitants.
130
 Local self-
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government was under the American political scheme neither recognized in theory nor in 
practice. Since the end of the eighteenth century it  was regarded as a mere privilege and 
not a right.
131
 Due to industrialization and immigration the cities increased in importance 
and became a tempting field for exploitation. ‘That the political machine in control of the 
state government should have yielded to the temptation to make a selfish use of its powers 
in this direction, is only what might have been expected’.
132
 That temptation was even 
stronger, when the party machine in control of the State did not have the political support of 
the local authorities. So happened in Pennsylvania, where the State Legislature in 1901, and 
the years to follow, crushed the opposition in charge in Pittsburgh and Alleghany, an act that 
was approved by the Supreme Court of the State.
133
  
                                       At the turn of the nineteenth century corruption was endemic in 
American cities, both within the ranks of city government and in the periphery. ‘City political 
machines did not hesitate to exploit the expansion of city services for their pound of 
patronage. City waterworks and sanitation departments, police forces and fire departments, 
health inspectorates and public bath departments were all used – often blatantly – as 
patronage favors and engines of political loyalty.’
134
 Lincoln Steffens, the most influential 
and respected of the journalists who made ‘muckraking’ their core business in the first 
decade, and an ardent enthusiast of city planning and the city manager, exposed the 
corruption in what soon became a remarkable series of articles in McClure’s. 
                                       As a preparatory project before he was to take up an editor’s post at 
McClure’s, Steffens visited St. Louis, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Chicago and New 
York. He described the boodle business in St. Louis, the practices of the grafters in 
Minneapolis, the general corruption in Pittsburgh, the actions of the political machine in 
Philadelphia, the opposition to reform in Chicago and, finally, the good government of New 
York City. Steffens concluded:  No one class is at fault, nor any one breed, nor any particular 
interest or group of interests.  The misgovernment of the American people is 
misgovernment by the American people. And the business man, that typical American 
citizen, is the chief source of corruption.
135
  
                                       Steffens’ exposé of the cities was part of the reform ideology of the 
Progressives, of which change in municipal affairs, be it overall reform as commission and 
city-manager plan or piecemeal modifications as the development of citywide school boards, 
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was a striking aspect. ‘Reformers loudly proclaimed a new structure of municipal 
government as more moral, more rational, and more efficient and, because it was so, self-
evidently more desirable. But precisely because of the emphasis, there seemed to be no 
need to analyze the political forces behind change. Because the goals of reform were good, 
its causes were obvious; rather than being the product of particular people and particular 
ideas in particular situations, they were deeply imbedded in the universal impulses and truth 
of ‘progress’.’
136
 For the Progressives urban reform was actually the battle of public impulses 
for ‘good government’ against a corrupt alliance of ‘machine politicians’ and ‘special 
interests’.  That is probably the reason why, for example in Des Moines and Pittsburgh, 
wards with a large lower class population were strongly opposed to reform since the 
machine was deeply involved in the representation of the wards in city councils. 
                                       The new upper classes, not the established ones, favored reform and 
together with the new business community, that had come to dominate the economic life of 
the city, they were the motor behind those municipal reforms. Replacing bad men with good 
ones did not suffice, reformers sought to concentrate political power by centralizing decision 
making, instead of distributing it through more popular participation. Innovations like the 
primary, the initiative, reform, recall and direct election were occasional tools. ‘Far more 
important in continuous, sustained day-to-day processes of government were those 
innovations which centralized decision making in the hands of fewer and fewer people’.
137
 
                                       The urban reformers aim was efficiency and not democracy and one of 
the changes that could support this ambition was centralization of representation, the shift 
from ward to citywide election of councils and school boards. So happened in Pittsburgh; by 
charter of 1911 a council of twenty-seven, each member elected from a separate ward, was 
to be replaced by a council of nine, each elected by the city as a whole.
138
 
                                       Behind this laid the fear of many reform leaders that lower- and 
middle-income groups had too much influence in decision making.  It led to, as a leader of 
the Newport, Rhode Island movement for municipal reform said at the National Municipal 
League convention of 1907, ‘a government established by the least educated, the least 
interested class of citizens’. So rather than someone who paid no taxes, he wanted the man 
who paid 5000 dollars taxes to have a say in the spending of his money within the municipal 
government.
139
 With the business community at the steering wheel one should not be 
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surprised that lower- and middle-class elements felt that the new city governments did not 
represent them. 
                                       Municipal reform in the early twentieth century, Samuel Hays 
concluded, contained a paradox: the ideology of an extension of political control and the 
practice of its concentration. The expansion of popular involvement in decision making was 
frequently a political tactic, not a political system to be established, but a device to secure 
immediate political victory. So Progressive reformers often espoused the direct primary 
when fighting for nominations for their candidates within the party, but once in control they 
often lost enthusiasm because it might result in their own defeat. The ideology of 
democratization of decision making was negative rather than positive; it served as an 
instrument of attack against the existing political system rather than as a guide to alternative 
action. It was used to destroy the political institutions of the lower and middle classes and 
the political power which those institutions gave rise to, rather than to provide a clear-cut 
guide for alternative action.
140
 
                                       That guide laid in the model of the business enterprise. The 
centralization of decision making, which was developed in the business corporation, was 
now applied to municipal reform. This, rather than the New England town meeting, provided 
the positive inspiration for the municipal reformer. ‘In giving concrete shape to this model in 
the strong-mayor, commission, and city-manager plans, reformers engaged in the 
elaboration of the processes of rationalization and systematization inherent in modern 
science and technology’.
141
 
                                       Reforms at a state level were closely linked to demands for (more) 
direct democracy, for giving power to ‘the people’, which should result in majority rule. The 
importance of direct democracy to reformers was inherent to the fact that is was considered 
as thoroughly democratic. As historian David P. Thelen frased it: 
                                      ‘If the masses of men and women ruled directly - with 
no governmental structures and hence no special 
privileges between them and real power - they could 
produce fundamental changes in the political 
economy. The masses could - and most progressives 
believed that they would - enact the spirit of the 
Declaration of Independence. Progressives profoundly 
believed that the great majority of citizens were 
inherently progressive.’
142
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                                       The tight control of political machines and their bosses over voters 
and office-holders was until the 1880s facilitated by the way votes were usually cast: in 
public, either by marked ballot or by viva voce. This universally accepted method was, 
because of perversions, challenged in Australia in the late 1850s and the legislature adopted 
an official secret ballot, printed and paid for by the public, and wholly controlled and 
handled by public officers. In the 1880s the reform reached the United States, where, 
modified, under the name ‘Australian ballot’, it became part of the electoral machinery in 
every State, starting with Massachusetts in 1888.
143
 The main aim of the Australian ballot 
was the prevention, through secrecy, of bribery, intimidation and fraud, but it also reduced 
the power of the boss and it facilitated reform movements. Furthermore the ballot law 
meant the legal recognition of the political party, which, until then was a voluntary 
association. Candidates would only be granted a place on a ballot paper if they were 
supported by a political organization, that had been successful at a previous election, most 
commonly a Democratic or a Republican group.
144
 
                                       The integration of the political party in the regulated nominating 
process simplified the spread of primary reform over the country. But there was a lack of 
uniformity for, as happens often with experimental measures, in a number of States the 
tendency was toward optional laws, in order to give political organization time to adjust. The 
aim of most States was to gradually approach a system that was similar to the one used in 
the general election.
145
  After some time the general mood was in favor of uniform 
mandatory primary laws for State and localities.
146
 It was in two States and one region in 
particular that the itch for direct democracy clearly and structurally took shape, with quite 
different results and consequences for the voters in that part of the nation and beyond: 
Oregon, Wisconsin and the American South. 
                                       Oregon was so unique in its approach that it became known as ‘the 
Oregon system’. It concerned a number of reform measures as the designation indicated: 
the right of initiative, of referendum, of recall and the popular election of Senators. With a 
11 to 1 ratio the people of Oregon in 1902 approved an amendment to the State’s 
constitution to  grant them the right to take the initiative for laws and amendments and the 
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right to approve or reject legislative acts.
147
 The proponents overtook a major legal hurdle 
when the Supreme Court of Oregon declared that both reforms were not unconstitutional, 
as being  in conflict with the republican form of government, meaning ‘a government 
administered  by representatives chosen or appointed by the people or by their authority’. 
The people, judge Robert Bean opinionated, had simply reserved for themselves a larger 
share of legislative power.
148
 An emergency clause gave the executive the right to overrule 
the public. W. S. U’ren, ‘father’ of the process, replied to charges of abuse of power by the 
people: ‘Capitalized vice, political grafting, legislative log-rolling and corporate tax-dodging, 
thus far, are the only industries in Oregon to confess injury from the people’s use of the 
initiative and referendum powers’.
149
 
                                       Two years later a primary law was accepted. The law contained a 
voluntary statement which proved both influential and controversial, for it gave candidates 
for elected office the choice between honoring the people’s choice for a seat in Congress or 
disregard it as just a recommendation.
150
 The fourth measure was the amendment, in 1908, 
to the State of Oregon’s constitution, which provided the recall of any elective public officer 
by the voters of the district from which he was elected. This was the ‘final crowning act to 
complete the temple of popular government’ in Oregon.
151
  
                                       Progressivism and reforms in Wisconsin are inextricably linked with the 
person of first Republican later turned Progressive Party leader and presidential candidate 
Robert La Follette sr. In the tensions between old and new politics La Follette emerged as 
‘the political leader who merged the reformers’ demands with traditional political 
methods’.
152
 He was a boss who dictated democracy. As Lincoln Steffens observed: ’Bob La 
Follette was restoring representative government in Wisconsin, and by his oratory and his 
fierce dictatorship and his relentless conspicuous persistence he was making his people 
understand – all of them, apparently, not only the common people, whom he preferred, but 
the best people too; they also knew ‘.
153
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                                       La Follette served as a Wisconsin Congressman for three terms in the 
1880s until he was defeated. According to his own account he became a progressive after 
being offered what he thought to be a bribe by one of Wisconsin’s powerful Senators, 
Philetus Sawyer. ‘Out of this awful ordeal came understanding and out of understanding 
came resolution. I determined that the power of this corrupt influence, which was 
undermining and destroying every semblance of representative government in Wisconsin, 
should be broken.’
154
  
                                       La Follette took on the Wisconsin machine in the 1894 campaign for 
the governorship with his support for an anti-Republican establishment candidate but lost. 
The same happened in 1896 and 1898 when La Follette was a candidate himself for the post. 
The machine prevailed. Despite advice to leave the Republican party and build up a new one 
he stayed on and never questioned the wisdom of this course.
155
 From 1896 on La Follette 
ignored most of the progressive reform issues and concentrated his efforts on the direct 
primary and building up his own machine style support of Scandinavian-Americans outside 
Madison, the State’s capital. With the help of ‘opportunists’ within the Republican machine 
La Follette got the governorship in 1900, but he questioned if this support was helpful or 
harmful with the public for it ‘put us off our guard in campaigning for a really progressive 
legislature’.
156
 
                                       During his six years as Governor, La Follette had to fight the still 
powerful machine to get his reforms through and regularly and especially in election time 
brought his case before the people by reading out roll calls and records of ‘wrongdoers’. He 
concluded: ‘And I cleaned up the legislature’.
157
 The Governor created a close cooperation 
with the public universities in the State, such as the University of Wisconsin in Madison, to 
help him with research, legal and financial aspects of his reform legislation and to develop a 
progressive policy. This phenomenon became known as ‘the Wisconsin Idea’. To enlarge the 
influence of the people on the government La Follette was one of the first politicians to 
follow Oregon in advocating the initiative, the referendum and the recall. In his second term 
he also got a bill for direct primaries accepted by the machine Senators.
158
 
                                       As Governor he championed reforms on a broad range, including the 
direct election of Senators, and with such a success that, six years after La Follette had 
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departed to Washington DC to become a Senator, Theodore Roosevelt at a convention in 
Ohio sang Wisconsin’s praises as a ‘laboratory of democracy’. La Follette and his successor 
‘turned that state into an experimental laboratory of wise governmental action in aid of 
social and industrial justice. They have initiated the kind of progressive government which 
means not merely the preservation of true democracy, but the extension of the principles of 
true democracy into industrialism as well as politics’.
159
 
                                       The South got its own kind of progressivism; it developed largely 
without any influence of the progressives from the western part of the country. The 
ignorance of the reformers west of the Mississippi and in the Midwest was astonishing. Even 
in 1912 Robert La Follette admitted: ‘I don’t know of any progressive sentiment or any 
progressive legislation in the South.’
160
 It was practically suppressed by historians until C. 
Vann Woodward described it.
161
 ‘Southern progressivism was essentially urban and middle 
class in nature, and the typical leader was a city professional man or businessman, rather 
than a farmer. Under the growing pressure of monopoly, the small businessmen and urban 
middle class overcame their fear of reform and joined hands with the discontented 
farmers’.
162
 All groups shared the same enemies: the plutocrats of the Northeast and 
‘foreign’ interests. 
                                       Before any Western state had accepted the direct primary it was 
already adopted by seven Southern States, starting with South Carolina in 1896.
163
 The 
demand for the direct primary was even stronger among Southern reformers than in the 
North for with the post-Reconstruction one-party system in place being nominated for the 
Democratic party meant election. In one essential way the primaries in the South were 
different from the one in the West and the North: they were for white men only, and after 
the introduction of the poll tax usually for non-poor whites. The combination of 
progressivism and white supremacy puzzled reformers elsewhere, but only to a certain 
extent. ‘The Southern leader who professed reactionary racial views and advanced political 
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and economic reforms in the same breath was known as a ‘demagogue’, unless he happened 
to be a political ally, in which case he was a ‘progressive’.
164
 
                                       Governors played a major role in implementing reforms in the South. 
Kentucky Governor William Goebel was assassinated for it. But being ‘reformist’ was the 
only thing most of them had in common; some were reactionary like Mississippi’s James 
Vardaman, some moderate like Georgia’s Hoke Smith and Arkansas Governor Jeff Davis was 
even labeled a ‘Karl Marx for Hill Billies’.
165
 Two reforms were dominant in the South. The 
first one was the containment of the railroads, legally or illegal by lawless night riders, and 
the second one prohibition. 
                                       The anti-liquor movement started locally. Until August 1907 there 
were no statewide laws against liquor in the South, but nevertheless 825 out of 994 counties 
were ‘dry’. 
166
 Soon prohibitionists formed a close alliance with urban progressive leaders. ‘It 
was a simple matter to lump the rum demon with the railroad monster as enemies of the 
people’, especially as there was a tendency for bosses and machines to join forces with 
liquor interests.
167
 In the end, concluded Woodward, progressivism had its day in the South 
as elsewhere, but it no more fulfilled the political aspirations and deeper needs of the 
masses of people than did the first New Deal administration.
168
 
                                       Was the direct primary the panacea of political reform? Charles E. 
Merriam was quite laconic in his observation when he concluded: 
                                                        ‘So far as its tendencies have been made evident, 
the direct primary has justified neither the 
lamentations of its enemies nor the prophecies of 
its friends. It has not ‘destroyed the party’, nor has 
it ‘smashed the ring’. It has not resulted in racial 
and geographical discriminations, nor has it 
automatically produced the ideal candidate.  Some 
‘bosses’ are wondering why they feared the law; 
and some ‘reformers’ are wondering why they 
favored it. The wiser ones in both camps are 
endeavoring to readjust themselves to the new 
conditions. Public sentiment generally favors the 
new system, and there is no disposition, except 
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among a few reactionary Bourbons, to return to 
the old régime’. 
169 
                                       A majority of the States, anyway, moved on toward direct 
democracy, including the direct election of their United States Senators. They chose two 
ways to achieve their goal. The first one was the obvious: directly elect your own Senator(s). 
Oregon was the first State to do so: in 1906 two Republicans, Jonathan Bourne and, before 
him for a short period, Frederick Mulkey, were chosen by the voters and then sent to 
Washington by the Republican majority in the State Legislature. Two years that majority was 
still Republican, but the voters elected a Democrat, former Governor George Chamberlain, 
for a Senate seat, instead of incumbent Republican Charles Fulton. The State Legislature 
honored the choice of the people, despite the different party affiliation. Nebraska soon 
followed the ‘Oregon system’ of direct election and other States, especially in the West and 
Midwest joined. Given the fact that in the South Democratic primary winners were secured 
of a Senate seat, a majority of the States were de facto choosing their United States Senators 
by the end of the 1900s, and their number in the Senate was getting closer by each Congress 
election to the two third majority needed for the approval of a Constitutional amendment. 
                                       Starting with California in 1892 and Nevada a year later States were 
petitioning Congress to amend the Constitution. Each new session of the Senate started with 
the arrival of requests and memorials from State capitals, but to no avail. So the States 
changed their strategy, knowing there was a second way to get what they wanted: using 
their power under Section V of the Constitution to call for a convention to consider 
amending the Constitution. It was ‘a high-risk strategy’.
170
 Once such a convention was in 
session there was no way to control the delegates for there are no provision in the 
Constitution, not even on its authority. So, in theory, it was possible that the convention 
would propose a whole new constitution. But the States seemed willing to ‘risk opening 
Pandora’s Box’.
171
 Nebraska was the first to ask for a convention in 1893 and after Texas had 
joined in 1899 the numbers of States favoring this way of securing the popular election of 
Senators multiplied until around 1909 the number was only two or three away from the two 
third majority, needed to force Congress to act. Would the Senate finally give in or would it 
risk a ‘runaway convention’?
172
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Chapter Three: Power To The People, Sort Of 
 
                             The first attempt to change the United States Constitution was proposed 
by New York State Representative Henry R. Storrs. On February 18, 1826 he offered a 
resolution in the House of Representatives, declaring it expedient that the Constitution be so 
amended that Senators be not appointed by Legislatures, but chosen by the electors in each 
State having the qualifications requisite for electors of the more numerous branch of the 
State Legislature. The mover apparently considered the question not being urgent for he 
requested it to lay on the table with other pending amendments; and there it remained.
173
 
Other resolutions, introduced between 1829 and 1855, met the same fate and were never 
debated. One ardent advocate of the change in the manner of election was Andrew Johnson 
of Tennessee. He proposed it as a Representative, after that as a Senator and in 1868 as the 
President of the United States. To no avail. 
                                        At the end of the 1880s in all sessions of Congress a number of 
resolutions on the issue were introduced; without exception they died in the Committee, 
who had the jurisdiction to decide if it was expedient to further the debate to the floor of 
the House. But in 1892 the Committee on Election of President, Vice-President and 
Representatives in Congress let a resolution pass and at the beginning of 1893 two thirds of 
the House agreed to submit an amendment for popular elections. 
                                       Nebraskan Republican Senator Charles van Wyck in 1887 was the first 
one to advocate an amendment in the upper house since Johnson in the early 1860s. A 
couple of months earlier the State Legislature had defied the vote of the Nebraskan 
population who, with a very large majority, wanted the Senator to retain his seat. But the 
Legislature choose a Republican who was a less vocal opponent of big corporations and 
railroads than Van Wyck, who turned his back on the Republican party and joined the 
Populists. A couple of years later other Senators had picked up the baton in favor of direct 
election, like the three newly elected Populists and three junior Senators, all from the West 
or Midwest . The Committee on Privileges and Elections reported, in majority, negatively, 
because, among others, popular vote of the Senate would open the door to direct election 
of the President and the misconception that indirect election was ‘wrong or unjust’.
174
 
                                       The Senate had a mighty army of fierce supporters of the status quo, 
mostly Senators from the Northeast. More important, those opponents of election reform 
held key positions, in the Republican party and, through many years of chairmanships, in the 
Senate itself. The elections of November 1892 brought a Democratic President, Grover 
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Cleveland, in the White House and the Democrats got a sizeable majority of 44 to 37 
Republicans in the Senate, next to the large House majorities they obtained in the elections 
1890 and 1892 elections. 
                                       Having just lost his powerful chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee, 
but retaining the same position at the Committee of Privileges and Elections, Massachusetts 
Republican Senator George Frisbie Hoar, the most important and influential opponent of 
direct elections at the time, delivered a major speech on the subject on the Senate floor in 
April 1893. It was a speech that settled the position of the Republicans for at least a decade. 
And given the majorities of the Republicans in the Senate between 1894 and 1912 it meant 
that the Senate would not vote in favor of an amendment for a long time. 
                                       First of all the objections of the Senator related to the unique position 
of the States the Framers had in mind when they made a choice for equal representation in 
the Senate. ‘From the change in the manner of election will surely and inevitably, in my 
judgment, follow the destruction of the equality of the States in the Senate. It is true the 
Constitution now provides that no State shall be deprived of its equal vote in the Senate 
without its consent. But this provision relates to a Senate to be constitutional and selected in 
the old constitutional manner, and will never be long tolerated, in my judgment, by the large 
States under the proposed arrangement.’
175
 So direct election would undermine if not 
destroy the constitutionally guaranteed States’ rights.  
                                       Hoar also feared that, whereas State Legislatures represented a broad 
average of the States’ population and so did the appointed members of the United States 
Senate, the proposed amendment would alter that situation. Instead of being exercised by 
the masses of its citizens the political power in the States would be removed to the great 
masses who are collected in the cities. ‘Chicago is to cast the vote of Illinois, Baltimore of 
Maryland, New York City of the State of New York, and Cincinnati of Ohio. The farmer class, 
which now have their just weight, will be outweighed by the dwellers of the great towns 
where the two extremes meet – great wealth and great poverty – and combine to take 
possession of the affairs of the Government’.
176
 
                                       Hoar categorized a number of other arguments against the proposed 
amendments, such as: the party conventions who were to nominate the candidates for the 
Senate could be as manipulative or corrupt as the criticized State Legislatures; popular 
election could also be prone to fraud as the history of the House showed; freedom of debate 
could become as restricted in the Senate as it had been in the House; partisanship would be 
the determining factor in popular elections, not the best interests of the State; the process 
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would not stop with the direct election of Senators but soon the President, the Vice-
President and the Judiciary would follow. Senators were as dignified a group of men as were 
the popularly elected Governors, the Massachusetts Senator argued, and the Senate had 
many times acted to the benefit of the country. And in a more generally way Hoar warned 
his colleagues that ‘the public man who appeals to temporary opinion or who flatters 
temporary passion will find his hold upon power as temporary and short lived as are the 
instrumentalities by which he seeks to obtain it’.
177
 
                                       For a decade the pattern  unfolded of a House of Representatives with 
an overwhelming majority approving a resolution in favor of direct elections and a Senate 
killing it in Committee. From 1902 on opponents found other ways to eliminate House 
resolutions.  After a fifth one was passed by an two-thirds majority, introduced in the Senate 
in February 1902 and referred to the Committee on Privileges and Elections, New York 
Senator Chauncey Depew, an opponent of direct elections presented an amendment to the 
resolution. The purpose was to establish uniform voting qualifications for the election of 
both houses of Congress and to hand Congress the power ‘to provide for the registration of 
citizens entitled to vote, the conduct of such elections, and the certification of the result’.
178
 
                                       The Senator knew which raw nerve he was hitting in the South with 
this provision for federal control of elections. Indeed it meant the end of the resolution, as 
was clear by the reaction of Texas Democratic Senator Joseph Bailey, who gave voice to the 
misgivings of many Southerners, when he said it was up to the States to decide who was 
qualified or not and so he was against the resolution . About a decade before Southern 
Democratic politicians and ordinary citizens had reacted furiously after the Federal Election 
Bill was introduced by then Congressman Henry Cabot Lodge and Senator Hoar, both 
Republicans from Massachusetts. 
                                       After the Compromise of 1877, which relieved the South of Northern 
federal supervision of its States’ administrations and paved the way for step by step black 
disfranchisement,  Republican Presidential candidate Benjamin Harrison promised electoral 
reform in 1888. After his election and with his approval, Lodge and Hoar attempted to 
reinforce the Fifteenth Amendment and roll back disfranchisement. The Lodge-Hoar 
proposal gave the federal supervisor power to control registration of voters, to pass on 
qualifications of challenged voters, and to decide between federal canvassers and State 
canvassers of an election. In that respect it provided a tighter control of elections than the 
1870 and 1871 acts to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
179
 Lodge 
defended the bill vigorously as ‘a moderate measure’ and an ‘anti-force’ bill, intended to 
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stop the exercise of illegal force by those who use it at the polls North or South
180
, but that 
was not how the South viewed the matter. 
                                       Politicians and press saw it as an force bill, which would, in the words 
of Alabama Democratic Senator James L. Pugh, be resisted by every parliamentary method 
‘allowed by the Constitution of the United States’.
181
 The bill assured white solidarity in the 
South at the expense of the Populists so long ‘as that bill threatens her with all the horrors of 
reconstruction days’. After a filibuster the bill was defeated by a 35-34 vote with Vice-
President Levi P. Morton casting the decisive vote, but the South was on guard for quite 
some time.
182
 With the defeat of the bill the Republican party and Congress virtually 
abdicated the field of civil rights legislation and the fight for equal rights for America’s black 
population.
183
 
                                       Pennsylvania Republican Senator Boies Penrose used another way to 
render a resolution harmless. He introduced an amendment to change the composition of 
the Senate as laid down in the Constitution. Next to the two Senators each State was 
entitled to, each State should have ‘additional Senators in proportion to its population, 
based upon a proportionate excess of population beyond that of the State having the lowest 
population in the last decennial census, but no State shall have more than fifteen Senators’. 
As one of the Eastern bosses the Pennsylvanian must have known that his proposal was 
unacceptable for a large majority of the sparsely populated Western states, who were 
essential for the approval of a direct election measure. Penrose was ridiculed for his 
amendment by, among others, the Washington Post, which called it an attempt to abolish 
the Senate itself, but the issue of parity and equal representation was much debated at the 
time, since States like New York and Pennsylvania had a so much higher population than, for 
example, Nevada or Wyoming. 
                                       Referring the House resolutions on direct election to the Committee on 
Privileges and Elections was a death sentence for a long time. And the procedure was 
difficult to avoid as long as New England Republicans were pulling the strings from the 
positions that mattered in decision making. William E. Chandler (New Hampshire) was the 
Chairman of the Committee until March 1, 1901 and Hoar, a former Chairman, was still a 
member and the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee. William P. Frye from Maine, a 
political ally of the two Senators, was the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and usually 
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the one who did the referral. They were a fortress almost impossible to take for the 
advocates of direct elections, like Arkansas Democratic Senator James H. Berry, who, in vain, 
challenged the Republicans to discharge the Privileges Committee and let the Senate discuss 
and decide. 
                                       Even after Chandlers retirement, his successor Senator Julius C. 
Burrows found out how firm Hoar’s grip on the Committee was. When Burrows introduced a 
resolution to permit the people to directly elect a Senator when, because of a deadlock in 
the State Legislature, no election of a Senator was possible, Hoar had no objection. But then 
he added: ‘I am very much afraid that if it were proposed by the Committee, it might get 
amended in the Senate so as to substitute for it the naked proposition of the election of 
Senators by the people, which, as you are well aware, I think would be very bad indeed.’ 
Burrows never brought up the proposal again.
184
 Only the demise of Senator Hoar in office in 
1904 gave Burrows more elbow room.  
                                       With the election in January 1909 of former Secretary of War and 
Secretary of State Elihu Root the opponents of direct election got a new philosophical 
leader. In a speech to the New York State Legislature that had elected him Root made his 
position clear: ‘I am opposed to the direct election of Senators as I am opposed to the 
initiative and referendum because these things are based on the idea that the people cannot 
elect Legislatures whom they trust. They proceed upon the idea of abandoning the attempt 
to elect trustworthy and competent State Legislatures. But if you abandon the attempt, if 
you begin to legislate or to amend constitutions upon that theory what becomes of all the 
other vast powers of the State Legislatures in maintaining the system of local self-
government under the Constitution?’
185
 Root felt this so strongly that after the Seventeenth 
Amendment was implemented he refused to be nominated again in 1914. 
                                       For most of the 1900s no significant changes happened in Congress. 
House resolutions kept dying in the Committee of Senator Burrows with assistance of 
amendments by Senators hostile to electoral reform like Depew and Penrose. But 1910 
became a turning point. The Republicans lost ten Senators in the November elections and its 
aftermath. The conservative leadership in the caucus
186
 had fallen apart and powerbroker 
and factual leader Rhode Island Senator Nelson Aldrich, who was in poor health, had decided 
not to run again. Other once mighty Committee Chairmen had retired and were, as Senators, 
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replaced by younger, less influential politicians or were defeated by Democrats. Two 
Western progressives, Republicans William Borah of Idaho and Joseph Bristow of Kansas, 
saw a window of opportunity for a direct election resolution. 
                                       Bristow, a first term Senator, two year before tried to add a direct 
election measure to the Sixteenth (constitutional) amendment about income tax but Finance 
Committee Chairman Nelson Aldrich considered the motion not pertinent and a Senate 
majority concurred. Next session of Congress Bristow reintroduced his proposal as a direct 
election amendment resolution in the Judiciary Committee, which had just got his 
sympathizer Borah as its junior member and which was supposed to be more favorable to 
the proposal as the hostile Privileges Committee. After a year of deliberations the Judiciary 
Committee issued a positive majority report,  written by Borah. For the first time the full 
Senate could debate a resolution and in the end vote on it. 
                                       The report emphasized that with direct election of the Senators State 
Legislatures could concentrate on State matters, without having to worry about deadlocks or 
charges of corruption; that the relationship between federal government and States would 
not be affected and that the equality of representation would not change.
187
 Nevertheless, 
opponents were quick to propose their ‘killer amendments’; Senator Depew, less than a 
month to go from retirement, introduced again his plan for uniform voter qualification, but 
more important was the amendment presented by Senator George Sutherland, a Republican 
from Utah. Congress would get the power to regulate time, place and manner of the 
elections, just like it had with the House of Representatives. The report was in favor of giving 
this power to the States, an obvious gesture to the Democratic Senators from the South, 
who in general were supporters of an direct election amendment.
188
 
                                       Senators from both sides of the scene took their positions. The opinion 
of Leroy Percy, Democrat from Mississippi, reflected the view of, probably, a large part of 
the Southern Senators when he said that his people favored popular election but they did 
not think it worth the price of lost State control over elections. The ‘monstrous and 
preposterous’ Sutherland clause would ultimately allow the federal government to invade 
the States and control all elections.
189
 Senator Cabot Lodge opposed granting the States the 
power to regulate and called it ‘retrogression and reaction of the worst kind’.
190
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                                       The most striking and agitating contribution came from Senator Root, 
not because it was, as one of his academic admirers called it ‘perhaps the most eloquent and 
thoughtful defense of the election of senators by State Legislatures that has ever been 
delivered in the Senate’
191
, but for raising the race issue, when he connected his support for 
the Sutherland amendment with the observation that from time to time ‘things happen’ in 
the Southern States, which should not permitted by the States, and which should be 
corrected, if not by the States themselves, then by the national government. Pressed by 
Southern Senators to give more specifics, Root said that among others the peonage system, 
the lynching of negroes and the disfranchising provisions such as the ‘grandfather’ clause in 
the Constitutions of many Southern States were calculated to deprive the black man of that 
equal protection that the Constitution guaranteed.
192
 
                                       Senator Borah,  noticing how inflammatory Roots accusations were for 
not only Southern Senators, but also Northern Democrats he needed for his resolution, 
accused the North of continuing to ‘play the hypocrite or the moral coward on the Negro 
question’, always assuming that in the North there is ‘a superiority of wisdom and of 
judgment and of virtue and of tolerance’ in reference to dealing with that question. Race 
prejudice in the North was no different from elsewhere and the negro should not be used as 
‘a political football’.
193
 The race issue was not the only question Borah had to solve to save 
his resolution. 
                                       His fellow Republican Senator from Idaho, Weldon Heyburn, one of the 
most conservative members of the Senate, was bitterly opposed to direct election and 
threatened to filibuster the proposal, if necessary until the end of the session of Congress at 
the beginning of March 1911. Heyburn was in a somewhat awkward position in the debate 
for his Idaho State Legislature had instructed him to vote in favor of direct election. The 
Senator intended to defy the instruction, saying:  ‘A man who is afraid of his Legislature or 
whose vote is affected by what his Legislature may do is not fit to be here.’
194
 Borah 
threatened to use the weapon of attrition with nightly sessions and since the other Senator 
from Idaho was not in good health, he gave in. 
                                       On February 24 the Senate voted on the Sutherland amendment and 
the proposal was carried 50 to 37, with Borah and his sympathizers joining Southern 
Democrats in the negative.
195
 Four days later the Senate voted on the Borah resolution. 
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Giving the voting ratio on the Sutherland proposal Borah pulled a strong result with 54 in 
favor and 33 against, just four votes short of the needed two third majority. A surprisingly 
high number of Southern Democrats voted for the Borah resolution, despite the federal 
control clause. But the biggest surprise was the affirmative of Senator Sutherland and Maine 
Republican and Senate President Pro Tempore William P. Frye.
196
 The narrow defeat bore 
the shape of things to come in the next session of Congress. 
                                       The 62
nd
 Senate, which convened in March 1911 differed remarkably 
from the former one. Ten Republican opponents had retired or were defeated, among them 
Senators Aldrich, Burrows, Depew and Eugene Hale from Maine. Most successors were 
either Democrats or progressive Republicans. House Democrats at once adopted a 
resolution on direct election, had it voted on by the Democratic dominated full House and 
sent it with a 296 to 16 favorable vote to the Senate, where it was introduced again by 
Senator Borah.
197
 A favorable report, similar to the Borah resolution from the 61
st
 Congress, 
emerged from the Judiciary Committee on May 1.
198
 Two weeks later Senator Joseph 
Bristow offered an amendment that omitted the provision about State control over time, 
place and manner of the Senators’ election.
199
 
                                       The strategic moves from a few months before re-emerged again as 
became clear when Senator Root declared that he would support the Bristow amendment 
but, in the end, would vote against the resolution, so trying to use the proposal from Bristow 
as a killer amendment. As the New York Senator had stated before, he was still convinced 
that reforms could be obtained through amendments of the 1866 election statute. ‘My plan 
is, after a Legislature has balloted twenty days in an unsuccessful attempt to elect a Senator 
by majority rule, a plurality vote shall suffice. This rule of plurality will at any rate be 
inevitable if we transfer to the people the duty now performed by the Legislature.’
200
 At the 
set date of the vote on the Bristow amendment and the resolution, June 12, Georgia 
Democrat Augustus Bacon moved to add a resolution to the amendment so the State would 
control the elections, unless the State Legislature refused or failed to act. In that situation 
federal supervision would be enacted.
201
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                                       The last minute proposal illustrated the fact that direct election was 
not the issue anymore, but States’ rights versus federal control. The vote on the Bristow 
amendment produced a tie, 44 to 44, with one Democrat, James Clarke of Arkansas voting in 
favor. The voting pattern was almost the same as with the Sutherland amendment and the 
strategic voting was as similar then. Borah and other supporters of direct election voted with 
Southern Democrats against and opponents voted with other Republicans for. With the 44-
44 tie it was up to Vice-President James Sherman to break it and as could be expected he 
voted for the amendment.
202
 Next, Bacon put his proposal to the vote, which he lost with 43 
to 46.
203
 
                                       The final vote on the Borah resolution was a clear victory for the 
advocates of a constitutional amendment: 64 to 24.
204
 The two thirds hurdle was taken by 
six votes; a large majority of Republicans from the West and North Central were joined by all 
Northern Democrats and, even more important, a clear majority of Southern Democrats, 
despite the Bristow clause. No region, the Northeast nor the South, could claim to be against 
the direct election of Senators as a solid block. 
                                       The debate in the Senate was not over yet, for Senator  James Reed of 
Missouri challenged the validity of Vice-President Sherman’s  vote on the Bristow 
amendment for never before had a Vice-President been the deciding factor on a 
constitutional issue. The challenge caught the Senate by surprise and could have resulted in 
recalling from the House the adopted Borah resolution. The vote in the Senate was 33 to 33 
and Vice-President Sherman, avoiding a controversial vote, declared the motion lost.
205
 The 
Senate resolution was unacceptable for the Democratic majority in the House because of the 
Bristow amendment, but a conference was called to meet the Senate half way.
206
 Senators 
and Representatives struggled with the amendment for a year and finally the House gave in 
and accepted the amendment. On May 17, 1912 Secretary of State Philander C. Knox 
distributed the proposed constitutional amendment to the States for consideration. 
                                       The thirty-six States needed to ratify the amendment took less than a 
year to do so. Massachusetts, home of the most ardent opponents of direct elections, was 
the first to do so, by acclamation. All over the United States State Legislatures followed, 
until, on April 8, 1913 the Connecticut House and Senate adopted the amendment, being the 
thirty-sixth and decisive vote. Remarkably, Connecticut also cast the most votes opposing 
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the amendment. Together with the Vermont House the Connecticut lower house cast 152 of 
the total 191 votes against the Seventeenth Amendment. A number of mainly Southern 
States did not vote on the amendment, but only three actually rejected it:  Delaware, Rhode 
Island and Utah. In a ceremony on May 31, 1913 Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan 
signed the Seventeenth Amendment, amidst other advocates, such as Senator Borah. 
Signing with silver pens, to remind the people of his ‘silver crusade’, Bryan remarked: ‘That 
marks the end of a long fight. The struggle for election of Senators by the people began 
twenty-one years ago in Congress, and eighty-seven years ago among the people.’ ‘Yes’, 
Borah agreed. ‘It began in 1826’.
207
 
                                       After they cast their votes against the measure some Republican 
Senators who were up for re-election in 1912, when the States were still in the process of 
ratification, chose to retire. Weldon Heyburn, who defied the will of his Idaho State 
Legislature, died in office before he could be asked to justify his position. William Borah, the 
most vocal advocate was re-elected by the Idaho voters, but the people of Oregon, who also 
had the popular vote did not nominate one of the prominent supporters of the reform, 
Jonathan Bourne, and even after he ran as an (independent) Progressive, preferred a 
Democrat as their senator. 
                                       It showed a rather mixed and sometime confusing picture, so how 
fared the rest of the 24 Senators who opposed the Seventeenth Amendment after the voters 
had a constitutional right to elect them? Two of the eight Southern Democrats died before 
November 1914, four were re-elected and the other two lost another nomination. Especially 
the defeat of the moderate Leroy Percy in Mississippi was striking. The State which, during 
Reconstruction, for a short time had two black national Senators, chose as Percy’s successor 
former Governor James K. Vardaman, who at a  campaign speech in April 1907 in Poplaville, 
Mississippi announced: ‘If it is necessary every Negro in the state will be lynched; it will be 
done to maintain white supremacy’.
208
 
                                       Illinois Senator William Lorimer’s vote against the amendment was his 
last major decision before his fellow Senators expelled him for fraudulent entrance into the 
chamber. New York’s Elihu Root, the most prominent Republican opponent of direct 
election, who was up for re-election in 1914 declined, as a matter of principle, to be a 
candidate again. Others, like both Senators from Vermont William P. Dillingham and Carroll 
S. Page, Connecticut’s Frank Brandegee and Reed Smoot from Utah, continued to serve 
under the new rules. The Senator from Utah kept being re-elected until 1932. 
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                                       Most telling about the way former opponents and their voters 
readjusted to the situation was the cynical but candid reaction of Pennsylvania Senator and 
Republican State boss Boies Penrose after his re-election in 1914 with a plurality of 46.76 
percent. To a reformist friend he confided: 
‘Give me the People, every time! Look at me! No 
legislature would ever have dared to elect me to 
the Senate, not even at Harrisburg. But the 
People, the dear People elected me by a bigger 
majority than my opponent’s total vote by over 
half a million. You and your ‘reformer’ friends 
thought direct election would turn men like me 
out of the Senate! Give me the People, every 
time!’
209
 
                                       The Pennsylvanian voters did not drive Penrose from office, but re-
elected him for another time in 1920; death ended his career, in 1921. 
                                       Penrose is perhaps the best example to disprove the Progressives 
claim that direct election of the Senate would restrain the power of the political machine, be 
it the Republican one in the Northeast or the Democratic one elsewhere. ‘With the possible 
exception of the giant corporation, no institution was so severely castigated by the middle-
class progressive as the urban political machine’, concluded historian of the Progressive 
movement John Buenker. Those machines and their constituents were busy taking care of 
food, clothing, jobs and, as the basis of their influence, votes as reformers saw honesty, 
efficiency and economy in government as the solution for the problems of urban, industrial 
America.
210
 
                                       So, of all the reform proposals of the Progressive Era,  the enactment 
of the Seventeenth Amendment should have met severe resistance from the machine, since 
it took from the bosses the power to manipulate State Legislatures, which was a less 
complicated task then manipulating numerous individual voters. But, Buenker said about 
this achievement , ‘almost without exception, it was one which had the overwhelming 
support of the urban machines’ minions in the major industrial states’.
211
 This statement, 
ironically, facilitated those opponents of the reform, who claimed that the only institution 
that benefitted from the Amendment was the machine. 
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                                       The approval of the machines, mostly Democratic, but also some 
Republican, all over the United States was most convincingly shown during the ratification 
process in 1912 and 1913. From San Francisco in the West, through Chicago, St. Louis and 
Milwaukee in the Midwest and New York City and Philadelphia in the East machine 
politicians voted in favor of the amendment. The strong showing of the Democrats in the 
1910 and 1912 elections made the victories even easier to obtain.
212
 The conclusion is 
justified that the urban political machine was a consistent and influential supporter of the 
direct election of the Senate. 
                                       But it did not mean that all progressive reforms were supported: the 
machine politician was ‘selectively pragmatic’.
213
 Especially the Democratic machines in the 
Republican dominated Northeast saw the advantages of direct election and started moving 
forward their own Senatorial candidates. As Buenker established: ‘The urban machine 
politician supported the Seventeenth Amendment out of a healthy mixture of idealism and 
self-interest, and it is difficult to separate the one from the other’.
214
  
                                       For most of its time as part of the Constitution the Seventeenth 
Amendment has not been the subject of much debate among politicians. Republican White 
House contenders or occupants Barry Goldwater, Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan may 
have been strong advocates of federalism and an diminished role of the federal government 
for the benefit of States and localities they never publicly question the wisdom of the 
amendment or asked for its repeal or reverse. Former Georgia Democratic Senator Zell 
Miller, a known maverick, broke the silence in 2004 when he introduced legislation to repeal 
the amendment. The Georgia Senator showed a strong sense of reality when he concluded 
that the proposal ‘does not stand a chance of getting even a single sponsor, much less a 
single vote beyond my own’ for it never got out of Committee.
215
 
                                       The issue was locked up again until the campaign for the 2010 
Congress elections. The Tea Party movement
216
, a loosely organized populist movement with 
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conservative and libertarian tendencies, supported a large number of Republican candidates 
for Congress seats.
217
 Some of those Tea Party favorites declared themselves in favor of 
repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment but retracted after Democratic accusations that they 
wanted to take the right to vote from the people. So the repeal was called a non-issue or not 
practical for the time being or candidates simply confessed to have been wrong on the issue. 
Since January 2011 the House of Representatives as well as the Senate has a number of 
confirmed ´repealists´, a third of all Republican candidates who had the support of the Tea 
Party movement. 
                                       Justice Antonin Scalia, one of the two most conservative members of 
the Supreme Court, and a well-known ´originalist´ in constitutional affairs gave the 
amendment further prominence during a debate with his colleague on the bench, Stephen 
Breyer, in Lubbock, Texas. Asked about changes he wanted in the Constitution Scalia said, 
according to a news agency report: ´There is very little that I would change. I would change it 
back to what they wrote, in some respects. The Seventeenth Amendment has changed 
things enormously.´ And: ´We changed that in a burst of progressivism in 1913, and you can 
trace the decline of so-called states´ rights throughout the rest of the 20
th
 century. So don´t 
mess with the constitution.´
218
 It should be noticed moreover that the junior Senator from 
Utah, Mike Lee, who has spoken out in favor of repeal, is a former Supreme Court law clerk 
for Justice Samuel Alito. This and Scalia’s position, which indicates the importance that is 
been given to the issue in conservative legal circles. 
                                       It is therefore no surprise that  the staunchest skeptics  on the 
amendment are to be found in conservative academic circles of the legal kind. The leading 
scholar in this group is George Mason University Law School professor Todd Zywicki, a 
regular contributor to conservative media on the issue.
219
 He has been a critic, in word and 
writing, of the Seventeenth Amendment since the early 1990s.
220
 Zywicki believes Senators 
would have much stronger ties with their States if the amendment had never been ratified, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
23.45 p.m.)  He criticized President Barack Obama’s Homeowners Affordability and Stability Plan, a government 
plan to help up to nine million homeowners to avoid foreclosure.   
217
 According to a New York Times survey of October 14, 2010 129 candidates for the House of Representative 
elections and 9 candidates for the Senate elections of 2010 had significant support of the Tea Party movement. 
‘Tea Party Set to Win Enough Races for Wide Influence’, New York Times, October 14, 2010. As of January 6, 
2012 62 Republican members of the House of Representatives and 4 Senators in the 112
th
 Congress had 
organized themselves in a Tea Party Caucus.  
218
 Report by Associated Press, November 12, 2010. 
219
 Cato Institute, National Review, The Volokh Conspiracy/blog. 
220
 Todd J. Zywicki, ‘Senators and Special Interest: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment’, 
Oregon Law Review Vol. 73, 1994. 
 59
and for example ‘Obamacare’ would not have happened, because it overrides State 
prerogatives in significant ways. Since in the original design Senators acted as ‘ambassadors 
of their state governments to the federal government’ they served as a significant check on 
the federal government.
221
 
                                       Politicians, who cherish their career would be wise to stay away as far 
as possible from the Repeal the Seventeenth movement. It is a reactionary campaign, 
encouraged by rightwing ideologists or opportunists, who have been jumping the Tea Party 
bandwagon. One can only guess their ulterior motives, but fear of change in a dynamic 
society and a nostalgic morality are probably basic ingredients. The restore-federalism 
movement is a peculiar mixture of firm believe in a dead constitution, a nostalgia for a time 
long past, a deep distrust of anything that reeks like ‘Washingtonian’ and a disgust for 
anything that is beyond people’s reach, a mix that works like castor oil for frustrated voters 
in times of crisis. It is a vent for frustration. 
                                       The Seventeenth Amendment did not solve the credibility problems of 
the Senate; special interests and party machines readjusted fast. Plus ça change, plus c’est la 
même chose (the more things change, the more they stay the same). But whatever its 
shortcomings, it was, at the time, one of the expressions of direct democracy. People felt 
they got the power, sort of, and there is no reason to take it away again. Rightly, the repeal 
movement will not succeed for a long time. 
                                       The amendment did not diminish the importance of State 
governments and State Legislatures. Of the twenty most senior members of the 112
th
 Senate 
(2011-2013) half began either in the State Legislature or in the State government. And of the 
twenty most junior Senators eight had the same career pattern.
222
 Four out of six of the last 
Presidents came to the White House from a Governor’s Mansion or lived there once;
223
 
President Barack Obama started his political career as a Illinois State Senator. Only president 
George H. W. Bush never held a political position at a State level. 
                                       The reformers of the 1900s and the 62
nd
 Congress, for what reason, did 
not go far enough when they left it up to the State to decide which procedure to follow in 
case of a vacancy in the Senate. The 2008 election and its aftermath brought the omission in 
the limelight. Once before, in 1960, two incumbent Senators had, as a team, been elected as 
President and Vice-President
224
, but President-elect Barack Obama, who was joined by 
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Delaware Senator Joe Biden as the Vice-President elect, also picked two sitting Senators for 
his cabinet.
225
 A third one, Republican Senator Judd Gregg from New Hampshire, eventually 
did not accept a post in the cabinet. 
                                       At the start of the new session, in January 2009, the Senate had four 
vacancies in Illinois, Delaware, New York State and Colorado. According to the Seventeenth 
Amendment and State law the Governors of the four States had the authority to appoint 
temporary replacements. Two of those did not go smoothly; New York Governor David 
Paterson had to pass President Kennedy’s daughter Caroline and Illinois Governor Rod 
Blagojevich ended up impeached and removed from office for trying to sell President 
Obama’s seat and was sentenced to fourteen years in prison
226
. 
                                       By now former, for defeated in the 2010 Senate election, Wisconsin 
Democratic Senator Russ Feingold took the accumulation of vacancies and the Illinois fraud 
case as an opportunity to propose an amendment to the Seventeenth Amendment. Co-
sponsored by two other Senators, Republican John McCain from Arizona and Democrat 
Richard Durbin from Illinois and Democratic Representative John Conyers, Feingold 
proposed to remove the possibility of temporary appointments and instruct ‘the executive 
authority’ to issue writs of election to fill vacancies.  
                                       Two thirds of American States leave it by law to the governor to make 
an appointment for the vacant Senate seat for the period until the next statewide election. 
Another ten allow the Governor to make a temporary appointment, but instruct the 
Executive to call a special election, the conditions of which differ. One State, Alaska, is in an 
ambiguous situation. Four States, Feingold’s own Wisconsin, Oregon, Massachusetts and 
Oklahoma, provide only for special election. In Oklahoma’s case the Governor is empowered 
to appoint the winner of a special election to fill the seat for the remainder of the term. 
                                       After the 2008 election, bills to restrict the elbow room of the 
Governor were introduced in the legislatures of eight states, but no further action was 
taken. Since 1913 183 Senators have been appointed to fill vacancies; 62 placeholders did 
not run in the next election, 56 did and lost, 60 did and win, including Vice-President Walter 
Mondale in Minnesota and former Democratic majority leader George Mitchell in Maine.
227
 
                                       Senator Feingold’s proposal has not been heard of since he left the 
Senate and will most probably end up in oblivion. This mending of the Seventeenth 
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Amendment should not have been acquired for if the States – the executive thereof - had 
acted accordingly to the intention of the text of the amendment: issue writs of election to fill 
vacancies, in order to meet the first part of the amendment: the Senate shall be composed 
of Senators, elected by the people. Ever since 1913 Governors and State Legislatures have 
been playing partisan games. In cases of a vacancy Governors, almost without an exception, 
have appointed politicians of their own ilk and some time from their own family to take the 
seat. Mostly they got the approval of like-minded Legislatures. 
                                       Democrats and Republicans alike have been gaming this way for the 
benefit of their own party. But particularly for the Democrats it has been bad politics. In 
Illinois a Republican is now in President Obama’s former seat and the result in 
Massachusetts has even been more embarrassing. The Senate seat, that had been ‘owned’ 
by the Kennedy family since John F. Kennedy’s election to the Senate in 1952, has been 
occupied by Republican Scott Brown since February 2010 and he will keep the seat until, at 
least, the 2012 elections. 
                                       This is how the Democrats played and lost in Massachusetts. Until 
2004 the Governor would appoint in case of a vacancy. That year incumbent Senator John 
Kerry was the Democratic presidential candidate and Mitt Romney the Republican Governor. 
To make sure that Romney would not choose a Republican as successor of a newly-elected 
President Kerry, the 4 to 1 Democratic majority in the Massachusetts Legislature changed 
the law and forced the Governor to hold a special election for a vacant Kerry seat, which, 
after all, did not become vacant.
228
 That law was enforced until Senator Edward Kennedy 
became terminally ill. He asked Democratic Governor Deval Patrick to reverse the law to its 
former status so Patrick could appoint a Democrat for Kennedy’s vacant seat.
229
 The voters 
did not appreciate this shenanigan and at the special election chose Brown over the 
Democratic candidate with 52 percent of the total vote.
230
 The developments in Illinois and 
Massachusetts show the urgency of further reform, but political opportunism undoubtedly 
will prevail. 
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Chapter Four: The Tyranny Of The Filibuster 
 
                                       Adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment did not resolve another 
problem with the Senate which occurred about the same time. But this could not be fixed 
through a change in the constitution. This was the Senate’s own business. It is laid down in 
1608 pages of ‘Riddick’s Senate Procedures’, a survey of all the rules and regulations of the 
Senate, from ‘Adjournment’ to ‘Yea and Nay votes’. It was one of those voting rules that 
caused increasing frustrations: the filibuster. 
                                       The story goes, for it is not for certain a fact, that George Washington 
drank coffee with Thomas Jefferson after the latter’s return from France. Jefferson inquired 
why the Constitutional Convention created a Senate. ‘Why did you pour that coffee into your 
saucer’, Washington asked. ‘To cool it’, was Jefferson’s answer. ‘Even so we pour legislation 
in the senatorial saucer to cool it’, Washington said.
231
 The story is probably as anecdotal as 
the one about Washington and the chopped cherry tree. 
                                       Less easy is it to deal with claims, which are so obvious to the general 
public that it does not consider them to be false. The notion that the Framers intended the 
Senate to be a deliberative body with no limitations to debate, in other words, a right to 
filibuster, is one of those false assumptions. ‘Each House may determine the rules of its 
proceedings’ says Article 1, Section 5.2 of the Constitution, a rule the Framers approved 
without opposition.
232
 There is no indication that the Framers desired procedural protection 
for minorities in the Senate, so theirs is not the vision of a Senate as a body of unrestrained 
debate and amendment.
233
 
                                       The idea of an inalienable right to filibuster is probably strongly 
connected to the aura around the phenomenon, highlighted in Frank Capra’s 1939 movie 
Mr. Smith Goes To Washington in which freshman Senator Jefferson Smith filibusters until 
he literally faints.
234
 In the words of CBS radio commentator H. V. Kaltenborn it is 
‘Democracy’s finest show, the filibuster, the right to talk your head off, the American 
privilege of free speech in its most dramatic form. Democracy in action.’ There are other 
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non-fictional examples of filibustering that appeal to the imagination, like, then still 
Democratic Senator Strom Thurmond, who for 24 hours and 18 minutes tried to prevent the 
Civil Rights Act of 1957 or the one by  Robert La Follette, who in 1908 spoke for 18 hours and 
23 minutes against a currency bill, which benefitted, to the Senator’s opinion the rich. La 
Follette covered his desk with books to read aloud when his imagination failed him.
235
 But 
the event is especially remembered for the drink incident. La Follette from time to time 
ordered a drink of milk and raw eggs and one of them was spoiled. ‘Take it away. It’s 
drugged’, the Senator shouted. This ‘attempted murder ‘ was merely a case of possible food 
poisoning, according to biographer Nancy Unger.
236
    
                                       Even though a change in Senate rules in 1806 made unlimited debate 
possible, members of the ‘original’ Senate
237
, the one that deliberated between 1789 and 
1859,  hardly did reach for the weapon of the filibuster, a term originating from the Dutch 
word vrijbuiter. The verdict is still out which filibuster was the first in the Senate’s history. 
The debate on the removal of the 1834 Jackson censure is marked as the first one in two 
major studies.
238
 
                                       President Jackson was censured in March 1834 for withdrawing federal 
deposits from the Bank of the United States and the following years Jacksonian Senators 
tried to reverse that decision. Three years later they reckoned to have enough votes for it 
and proposed the expunging of the censure from the Journal. The resolution was debated 
for days and finally supporters were preparing themselves for an exhausting finishing debate 
as Jacksonian Senator Thomas Hart Benton (Missouri) recalled in his autobiography: 
 ‘Expecting a protracted session, extending 
through the day and night, and knowing the 
difficulty of keeping men steady to their work 
and in good humor, when tired and hungry, 
the mover of the proceedings took care to 
provide, as far as possible, against such a state 
of things; and gave orders that night to have 
an ample supply of cold hams, turkeys, rounds 
of beef, pickles, wines and cups of hot coffee, 
ready in a certain committee room near the 
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Senate chamber by four o’clock on the 
afternoon of Monday’.
239 
                                       It paid off, for while it was near midnight and the almost 
completely present Congress and the gallery were preparing themselves for a long night two 
Senators from the opposite side came to Benton and declared: 
                                             ‘This question has degenerated into a trial of 
nerves and muscles. It has become a question 
of physical endurance; and we see no use in 
wearing ourselves out to keep off for a few 
hours longer what has to come before we 
separate. We see that you are able and 
determined to carry your measures so call the 
vote as soon as you can please! We shall say 
no more.’  
                                                                                     By a 24 to 19 vote the censure was expunged from the Senate 
Journal.
240
 
                                       Systematic search of the Senate voting record brought political 
scientist Gregory Koger to the conclusion that the first filibuster might have happened in 
1831 and concerned a House bill to alter a drawbridge across the Potomac. The Senate 
rejected five motions to adjourn, with five to seven Senators opposing the bill and 18 to 21 
supporting it. Finally the Senate adjourned and the bill was neglected for the rest of the 
session.
241
  
                                       With the appearance of the filibuster came the urge for limiting the 
debate, so in 1841 Henry Clay, a Whig Senator from Kentucky in a Whig dominated Congress 
and with a Whig president, William Henry Harrison, in office proposed to curb the time of 
debate to one hour per individual Senator and call the previous question afterwards, which, 
in a somewhat confusing terminology, meant closing the debate and vote. It met fierce 
opposition from Democratic Senators. Wiliam R. deVane King from Alabama – it was in the 
midst of summer -  promised a long filibuster so Clay ‘may make his arrangements at his 
boarding house for the winter’.
242
 And Senator Benton threatened to leave the Senate for 
good.  ‘When the previous question shall be brought into this chamber – when it shall be 
applied to our bills in our quasi committee – I am ready to see my legislative life terminated. 
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I want no seat here when that shall be the case’.
243
 Since even other Whig Senators felt 
reluctant to persevere Clay folded and abandoned procedural reform.
244
  
                                       The issue of the need for limitation of debate regularly was raised in 
the Senate, among others during the famous extended debates from December 1828 and 
May 1829 between Senators Daniel Webster from Massachusetts and Robert Y. Hayne from 
South Carolina, but also at other occasions.
245
  On three other times in the nineteenth 
century, in 1850, 1891 and 1893, rule reform was considered but withdrawn again and only 
once, in 1873, did the Senate vote on a resolution, that was defeated by 25 to 30.
246
 With 
the Republicans having a 17 to 55 majority in the Senate at least thirteen of them must have 
had reservations about this form of party domination or must have feared filibustering by a 
united group of Democrats. 
          An enormous conflict in the spring of 1917 between Democratic President Woodrow 
Wilson and a group of eleven Senators, mostly Progressive and isolationist Republicans,
247
 
was the overture to a major filibuster reform.  Wilson had severed diplomatic ties with 
Germany and had asked Congress to authorize him to arm merchant vessels and to protect 
American property and lives on the high seas. The House voted in the affirmative by an 
overwhelming majority of 403 to 14 and 75 Senators signed a declaration favoring the 
passage of the measure. The group of eleven, vigorously opposed, filibustered so it could not 
be voted on before the end of the session. In a public statement Wilson declared: ‘A little 
group of willful men, representing no opinion but their own, have rendered the great 
government of the United States helpless and contemptible’.  And to that he added: ‘The 
only remedy is that the rules of the Senate shall be so altered that it can act.’
248
 
                                       On the third day of the special session in March 1917, Democratic 
leader Thomas Martin proposed a rule, supported by a Committee of five Democrats and 
five Republicans, for cloture, which became known as Rule 22. It determined that sixteen 
Senators could end debate if a motion to it was approved by two thirds of Senators present.  
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The strongest opposition came from La Follette, who stated he would stand against any 
cloture that denies free and unlimited debate.  In the end only he and two other Senators
249
 
voted against the cloture rule as 76 Senators supported the reform. One of the first issues 
that was voted on under Rule 22 was the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles in November 
1919.
250
 The ratification was rejected. 
                                       Rule 22 remained manageable until the early 1960s. As early as 1925 
Republican Vice-President Charles Dawes – not a politician by profession, but a former 
administrator and businessman plus an acerbic critic of the Senate and its procedure – in his 
first address as President of the Senate proclaimed its rules an outrage against democracy 
and an invitation to swindle. But his plan for a cloture by a majority vote was doomed since 
not even half of the 54 Republican Senators supported it. With an overwhelming majority of 
the 41 Democrats against, their leader, Senator Joseph Robinson, estimated that as many as 
eighty of the 96 Senators would have voted against the Dawes Plan. In the decades to follow, 
until the 1960s, less than thirty clotures were filed and just a few were invoked. Almost 
every cloture that involved civil rights legislation failed.
251
 
                                       It is not easy to determine if Senators until the 1960s shunned cloture 
for practical and political or principal reason, or supported it for that same matter. Political 
objectives could have dictated the behavior of Senators on cloture and reform. In that case 
they seemed to use the rules to serve their goals (policy and otherwise), and they used those 
rules to protect rules that served their goals.
252
 Gregory Koger suggest the choice could be 
fairly pragmatic. Sometimes Senators could support cloture in order to vote for a target bill, 
even though their opinion about that bill is lukewarm. Ideology could be the main motive. A 
vote does not have to be an expression of conscience, but may be practical: if I don’t invoke 
the rule on them, they hopefully won’t do it on me.
253
 The choice could be tactical too. 
Proponents had a majority for cloture but waited to invoke it, so the other party could not 
use it for martyrdom. Attrition was a much better tool.
254
 
                                       Sometimes it was a mixture of both principle and politics. For example, 
before the end of the 1960s, Southern Democrats filibustered all kinds of civil rights 
legislation for principled reasons. And they opposed cloture on the same legislation for 
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practical reasons. Between 1917 and the mid-1990s fifteen Senators had a perfect record on 
cloture; four of them supported it all of the time of their tenure and eleven opposed it all of 
the time. Seven of those eleven were Southern Democrats who held office most of the time 
before 1965, the year of the last major piece of the civil rights legislation, the Voting Rights 
Act.
255
 
                                       Since cloture was unpopular and ineffective because it required a two 
third majority, attrition was an effective alternative weapon against filibustering. This 
strategy had a clear result in the 1960s when the major civil rights legislation was introduced 
in Congress. Southern Democratic Senators were vehemently opposed to it and were 
prepared to use every procedural tool available to block it. They found a formidable 
opponent in Democratic Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson who, from the end of February 
until March 8, 1960 held the Senate in session for 157 hours, held thirteen roll call votes and 
fifty quorum calls, which filled over 650 pages of the Congressional Record. The South 
carried on and Johnson called off the twenty-four-hour sessions. A cloture motion failed and 
the debate went on. A new cloture would probably fail again and, finally, the bill was 
passed.
256
  
                                       The passage of the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act after a record 57 
days filibuster meant an important shift in procedures because for the first time cloture was 
invoked on a civil rights bill. After the fight over the 1960 act Senators had been rethinking 
the idea of unlimited debate and in 1961, for the first time since 1927, had invoked cloture. 
Mike Mansfield, Johnson’s successor as Majority Leader for the Democrats, was strongly in 
favor of cloture and had proposed a measure to bring back the supermajority from two-
thirds to three-fifth but it failed. The Majority Leader had sought cloture on the 1964 Act 
from the start and told then-president John F. Kennedy in a memo so. But he held back, gave 
Southerners the opportunity to make their case and ensured a large coalition, including 
Republicans, for the bill. Mansfield got cloture accepted this way.
257
 
                                       Debate on cloture reform  in the rest of the 1960s and the first half of 
the 1970s concentrated on the preference for a supermajority of three-fifth or a simple 
majority of 51. Reformists like Senators Hubert Humphrey and Frank Church within the 
Democratic caucus favored the latter, but influential colleagues like Mansfield and Senator 
Albert Gore sr. opted for the three-fifth majority as an appropriate balance between the 
need to close debate and minority rights.
258
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                                       From 1975 on, and especially since the first Clinton Congress, 
filibusters have become a regularly used partisan tool of the minority party. 
259
 Cloture has 
gone ‘from taboo to commonplace’.
260
 Sixty votes has become the criteria for bills and 
nominations, administrative and judicial. Between 1917 and 1971 – that is 27 Congresses - 
there were 51 votes on cloture, of which eight were invoked. Between 1991 and 2006 – 
eight Congresses – the scores were 419 votes and 172 invokes. And since 2007 until October 
15, 2011 – less than three Congresses – the numbers are 227 and 138. 
                                       Filibustering, which once was the ultimate weapon to prevent the 
tyranny of the majority has become the ultimate tool of a tyrannical minority. Ever since the 
mid-1990s it has been used by Democrats and Republicans alike to frustrate or even paralyze 
government, to the extent that the majority threatened to go for the ‘nuclear option’:  
decisions by a simple majority. That threat was most imminent in 2005 when the Democrats 
filibustered the appointment of ten candidates for appellate courts by president George W. 
Bush. The Republicans had a 55 to 45 majority in the Senate and Republican Majority Leader 
Bill Frist threatened to change the Senate rules on voting by a majority vote. A group of 
fourteen moderate Senators, seven Republicans and seven Democrats, sat down together 
and negotiate a compromise. This ‘Gang of Fourteen’
261
 saved the Senate from coming to a 
complete standstill.
262
 
                                       Leaders from Democrats and Republicans are holding each other 
hostage on the issue. When Democratic Senators proposed to curtail the power of the 
Republicans in January 2011 to rush president Obama’s agenda through Congress, 
Republican Senator Lamar Alexander issued a cynical, but clear warning – and this was 
before the new Republican majority in the House showed its muscle in the budget and public 
debt debate: ‘Those who want to create a freight train running through the Senate today, as 
it does in the House, might think about whether they will want that freight train in two years 
if it is the Tea Party Express’. Later in January 2011 Harry Reid, the Democratic Leader in the 
Senate, and Mitch McConnell, the Republican Minority Leader agreed ‘by handshake’ to call 
a standstill on filibuster reform. 
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                                       Cloture reform is inevitable in order to prevent further clashes in the 
Senate and having it become even more dysfunctional. In 1995 Democratic Senators Tom 
Harkin from Iowa and Joe Lieberman from Connecticut proposed a sliding scale cloture. The 
proposal was supported by another group of seven Democrats but went down by a 76 to 19 
vote. At the beginning of the 112
th
 Congress Harkin introduced the same reform again, but 
after the agreement by Reid and McConnell, it was defeated with an even larger majority, 88 
to 12.
263
 ‘There is no reform more important to this country and to this body than slaying the 
dinosaur called the filibuster’, Harkin proclaimed sixteen years ago.
264
 The 1995 proposal 
would be a good start, to end the iron rule of the supermajority that is paralyzing 
government lately, though its chances are less than meager when both sides of the Senate 
still want to preserve the right to obstruct come the time they are in a minority position. 
                                       The sliding scale proposal from Senators Harkin and Lieberman means 
that cloture procedures start with the sixty votes which are required under Rule 22. When 
this threshold proves to be too high it is lowered at the next vote to fifty-seven. If that is still 
too much to pass it the threshold is lowered again by three votes to fifty-four, and if that is 
not enough to a simple majority of fifty-one. It is probably the only solution to escape the 
ever more occurring picture of the Senate as a dysfunctional institute. Despite all the 
handshakes between Senate leaders on filibusters and clotures recent history has proved 
that despite the supermajority of Rule 22 they will reach for the ‘nuclear option’ as a last 
resort. Republican Majority Leader Bill Frist threatened to do it in 2005, Reid did it in a 
disguised manner as recently as October, 2011 with respect to president Barack Obama’s 
Jobs Bill.
265
 
                                       To avoid these flares of Senate warfare the sliding scale should be 
introduced and implemented as a revision of Rule 22. To make it acceptable to any minority 
party and to ensure that ample debate is guaranteed a few conditions should be add to the 
new rule. There should be advance notice of any step of the sliding scale and loopholes in 
the present procedure have to be fixed. These and other reforms have been proposed by 
Sarah Binder, a political scientist at the Brookings Institute in Washington, and Steven Smith, 
professor in political science at the University of Minnesota,
266
 and they are worth a try, 
though reality compels one to admit that it requires a political Hercules to clean this Senate 
stable. In finding a better balance between lengthy debate and final action five aspects of 
deliberation should be respected. A minority of the Senate should be able to raise issues, 
which were perhaps too quickly considered by the House of Representatives; Senators 
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should have the opportunity to address new issues since the action by the House; there 
should be room to educate the public about the effects of bills; it should be possible to 
incorporate feedback by the public and extended debate should be allowed to win support. 
But in the end a final vote should be taken without supermajorities.
267
 There are certain 
dangers to majority rule – for, be it in steps, that is what the sliding scale eventually comes 
too – and one is that the adoption of majority rule becomes irrevocable.
268
 But ultimately 
what counts is this observation by Binder & Smith: ‘Preventing a chamber majority from 
finally casting a vote on any legislation is unsustainable in a truly democratic and deliberative 
institution’.
269
 
                                       Skeptics on filibuster reform like Koger should be taken seriously since 
they take the function of the filibuster – a bulwark against the tyranny of the majority – 
serious. The U. S. Congress has ‘tolerated filibustering throughout its history despite 
inconvenience, instability, and delay’
270
. Filibustering is ‘endemic to the legislative 
process’
271
 and legislators have ‘filibustered to gain a hearing for lost causes and political 
minorities’
272
 or ‘to prevent redemption of [America’s] promise of civil rights’. The Senate 
still ‘embodies the notion that every legislator should have influence, that minorities should 
be heard, and that there are bounds to the bonds of party’.
273
 The right to obstruct is deeply 
woven into the daily operations of the contemporary Senate
274
 and not only politicians see it 
as the last check against the abuse of power in Washington
275
, but public opinion does too. 
                                       The abuse of the filibuster since the early 1990s, for the sake of 
frustrating government and damaging the image of the executive for electoral gain, has led 
to serious gridlock on Capitol Hill. It damages politics in the eyes of the public. Only in August 
2011 Gallup polled that the image of Congress had reached an all-time low with thirteen 
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percent of the population approving its job and 84 percent disapproving.
276
 The next 
example shows how justified this gut feeling of the public may be. 
                                       Under the banner ‘The Empty Chamber – Just how broken is the 
Senate’ The New Yorker in the summer of 2010 published a much quoted impression of one 
day in the upper house. It is a humiliating picture of a deadlocked chamber, with Senators 
spending their time with long speeches instead of debate and deliberation. Democrats and 
Republicans thwart each other with obscure procedures like holds and secret holds, they ask 
for quorum calls and propose amendments with the sheer purpose of slowing down the 
decision-making process. Senators close up shop after three days in order to fly home so 
they can spend Friday, Saturday, Sunday and Monday raising money for their re-election. 
                                       But that was exactly what the Framers intended, Senator Alexander, a 
Republican from Tennessee, explained to the author. ‘The Senate was not created to be 
efficient. It was created  to be inefficient’.
277
 It is quite a remarkable interpretation of James 
Madison’s statement: ‘The use of the Senate is to consist in proceeding with more coolness, 
with more system, and with more wisdom, than the popular branch’.
278
 With the emphasis 
on obstruction and slowing down instead of improvement and reasoning the function of the 
Senate is nowadays not so much to serve as a saucer to cool legislation, but to waste it. 
                                       In 1926, nearly ten years after the implementation of cloture rule, 
political scientist Lindsay Rogers undermined the importance of the reform by postulating 
that ‘even if the filibustering minorities kill some meritorious legislation and treaties, the 
price will be a small one to pay for retaining some measure of legislative control of the 
executive’. 
279
 Especially the opportunity for Senators to an unrestrained investigation of the 
executive was crucial in his defense of the filibuster.
280
 Twenty-three later two Southern 
Democrats and one from the West
281
 dared the proponents of a cloture ‘to present one 
single example of any real injury to the American people caused by the delay on legislation 
due to extended debate’.
282
 Since the question was unanswered during the hearing on the 
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subject, they found none, the Senators concluded. These two propositions can be 
categorized as part of the ‘little-harm thesis’, meaning the filibuster has not harmed public 
welfare and may sometimes have served it. 
                                       But Binder & Smith, more than four decades later, took up the gauntlet 
and proved that the thesis is at least questionable. Between 1917 and 1994, as they 
researched, thirty measures and bills were killed by filibusters, and 26 would have directly 
changed public law had not a minority of Senators prevented it.
283
 The overview shows that 
most of the killings happened after 1963 and so the observation by both Rogers and the 
three Senators serves no credit. And the table also makes clear that between the 1960s and 
the mid-1990s the filibuster ‘became a more deadly weapon’.
284
 So the ‘little-harm thesis’ is 
hardly defendable, since some of those bills concerned consumer protection, labor-
management relations, the federal death penalty, taxation, economic stimulus, campaign 
finance reform, and lobbying reform.
285
 Figures of the period between January 1994 and 
October 6, 2011 show that more than 200 measures and bills were killed by filibusters or 
failing cloture and at least 140 of them would have had an impact on the life of the American 
public.
286
 
                                       Another remarkable phenomenon is the number of successful 
filibusters against judicial nominations by president Bush in his first term: 22. Democrats 
rejected the candidates because they were considered too conservative for the bench. 
Tensions mounted so high that Republican majority leader Bill Frist from Tennessee 
threatened to invoke the ‘nuclear option’ and only after ‘mediation’ by the fourteen 
moderate Senators both parties agreed not to filibuster judicial nominations anymore.   
                                       There is another problem which can not easily be solved. The Senate 
can not do it, the states can not do it, the people probably can not do it. It may acquire a 
new constitutional convention to solve it, something that is not impossible, but highly 
unlikely to happen. The issue at stake is one of the genial strokes the Framers pulled on the 
powers that be, perhaps even without realizing it. The final stage of the Constitutional 
Convention dealt with the question in what manner and under which conditions states could 
amend the Constitution if they wish to do so. The Framers decided in Article V on two 
modes, a new convention at the order of two-thirds of the States and an initiative by 
Congress, adopted by a two-thirds majority and afterwards ratified by three-fourths of the 
States. 
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                                       Roger Sherman from the  Connecticut delegation, who had been the 
mover of the Connecticut Compromise on the election of the Senate, showed his reluctance 
for fear that three fourths of the States ‘might be brought to do things fatal to particular 
States, as abolishing them altogether or depriving them of their equality in the Senate’. Later 
on in the debate Sherman moved for a proviso to pronounce that ‘no State shall without its 
consent be affected in its internal police, or deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate’. It 
was rejected with only the delegations of Connecticut, Delaware and New Jersey in favor, 
the same three delegations which introduced the Connecticut Compromise. Finally, 
Connecticut’s Governor Morris moved the proviso that became the final part of Article V 
‘that no State, without its consent shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate’, 
which was agreed upon without debate.
287
  
                                       This iron-clad rule has since frustrated many critics of the equal 
representation in the Senate, which favors to their opinion the smaller States in the United 
States in a very disproportionate way. As early as 1895 Colliers Weekly editor Samuel E. 
Moffett researched the consequences for voting records and found out they were little. ‘In 
most cases the balance has been quite as even as it would have been with Congressional 
districts’. And on every major issue between 1807 and 1889 small States had voted divided. 
Drawing a horizontal line over the United States resulted in almost the same voting pattern 
in the North and in the South, at least until the 1890s.
288
 
                                       The political balance in 2011 is hardly a different story. The ten 
smallest States
289
 have among themselves nine Republicans Senators, ten Democrats and 
one Independent; the ten largest States
290
 have eight Republicans and twelve Democratic 
Senators. Nowadays, there is hardly any issue if any anyhow imaginable where the two 
Republicans Senators from Wyoming would vote the same way as the Democratic and 
Independent Senator from Vermont. Just as the two Democrats from California differ from 
the two Republicans from Texas. 
                                       Thirty years after Moffett Carroll H. Wooddy from the State College of 
Washington did another research of voting in the Senate in order to decide if the chamber 
was representative or not and how frequently those conditions have occurred in the twenty-
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five Congresses between 1875 and 1923.
291
 When votes were ‘unrepresentative’ in the 
sense of Senate majorities representing a minority of the population they appeared to favor 
thinly populated areas. Proportionate representation would have modified but not 
eliminated the divided control in eight of the researched Congresses, the study found out. 
                                       Wooddy did not take a stand on the issue of fair representation, but 
thought the results important in view of ‘the ascendancy of the Senate over the House, 
completely re-established during the last decade, and manifesting itself in a growing 
tendency of the public to regard the Senate as the body which really represents their 
interests, both in legislation and in enforcing the responsibility of the executive’.  This was 
indeed an intriguing issue: did the voters think their two Senators, who represented the 
whole State served their needs better than the Representative of their district in the House? 
                                       Realizing how difficult, if not impossible, it would be to find any small 
State willing to give up its disproportionate equal representation within the Senate, 
academics have for decades been searching for a way to slay this dragon in front of the 
Senate. Some of the proposals are, realistically speaking, merely theoretical. Large States like 
California or Texas could ‘increase their representation in the Senate by self-partition into 
several smaller States of equal size, with each new State represented by two Senators. Thus, 
California, for example, would self-partition into sixty-five new States, each having 
approximately the same population as Wyoming’.
292
  Article V, section 3 of the United States 
Constitution may permit this. The authors, University of Texas law professor Lynn A. Baker 
and University of Arizona economist Samuel H. Dinkin, acknowledge that this notion could 
be considered as ‘unwieldy or simply preposterous’.
293
 A last resort could be ‘popular revolt’ 
by the seventy-two percent of the American population residing in the eighteen States that 
receive ‘disproportionately little representation in the Senate relative to their shares of the 
nation’s population’.
294
 
                                       Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the late Democratic Senator from New York, 
proclaimed in the 1990s that ‘somewhere in the next century we are going to have to face 
the question of apportionment in the United States Senate’. Baker & Dunkin gave a short 
comment on that: 
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 ‘It is one thing to understand the various 
problems of governance that the apportionment 
of the Senate currently creates, and quite another 
to solve them within the confines of our 
Constitution. We are not as confident as Senator 
Moynihan that the structure of congressional 
representation will be altered in the next 100 
years – unless there is a revolution of the sort that 
ultimately gave rise to the Constitution of 1787’.
295
    
                                       Political scientist Larry Sabato most recently has been dealing with 
the issue of representation in the context of an attempt to fix faults in the Constitution.
296
 
Equal representation in the Senate is one of them. The Senate is ‘a body now so 
unrepresentative of America’s population that a mere 17 percent of the voters install a 
majority of Senators. No one wants a ‘tyranny of the majority’, where 51 percent of the 
voters run roughshod over the rights of the other 49 percent, but we have now achieved the 
opposite, equally distasteful extreme, a tyranny of a small minority’.
297
 With equal 
representation rather than proportional representation the Framers intended the Senate to 
be a bulwark, which should protect minority rights from the tyranny of the majority. But, 
states Sabato, the desires of the founders have been taken to an extreme and the current 
Senate is ‘absurdly skewed in the direction of the small states’
298
. 
                                       Sabato’s proposal is an adjustment that he thinks is potentially 
acceptable to most small States. The ten largest States would each be given two extra seats 
in the Senate and the next fifteen largest States would gain one additional seat. The rest 
would keep their current two seats. The new Senate would then consist of 135 members. 
Furthermore former Presidents and Vice-Presidents could be appointed as national 
Senators. There are currently eight of them, four Democrats and four Republicans.
299
 ‘It 
would be especially influential when the former officeholders agreed across party lines – and 
this would happen more often than cynics think’.
300
 Moreover the ex-Presidents and Vice-
Presidents could potentially shape public opinion, making it a bit easier for Senators to cast 
an unpopular vote in the national interest. 
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                                       The ‘legal bump’, as Sabato calls it, to Senate reform is still the last 
provision of Article V. A Constitutional Convention – which has to be called by two thirds of 
the States – could propose an amendment to remove the Senate proviso from Article V. 
Afterwards in a separate amendment the Senate could be expanded. Lots of complicated 
problems could arise and ultimately the Supreme Court may be the arbiter. ‘As the founders 
could have told us, Constitution making is thorny and perilous. Yet all of the most vital and 
rewarding elements of nation building are thorny and perilous’.
301
   
                                       The most original solution was delivered some eighty years ago by 
Blewitt Lee, a former Chicago law professor and New York attorney. He suggested to 
demolish the Article V clause by an amendment to abolish the Senate as an institution. It 
could be done, because the clause is about a change in the composition of the Senate and 
not its existence as such. It should not be impossible to find enough States to concur since 
they already had Senates with representation on the basis of population. The Supreme Court 
probably would not object to such an amendment. ‘A constitution which cannot be 
amended as circumstances require would be a rather dreadful and, in time, a very 
dangerous thing’. And to add some perspective he concluded: ‘The compromise over 
representation is no more binding than the compromise over slavery’. 
302
 This may not have 
been overly realistic, but it was quite refreshing.                             
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Conclusion 
 
                                       Almost one hundred years ago Congress adopted the direct 
election of the Senate, hoping it would create a chamber less prone to corruption and 
bribery, more of the people and for the people instead of being an easily manipulated 
instrument in the hands of special interests and political machines. Nothing much has since 
changed in the overall image of the Senate. It is by and large still a millionaire’s club, as Main 
Street charged before 1913. Twelve Senators have a personal wealth of over ten million 
dollars and seven of over five million, with Massachusetts Democrat John Kerry by far on top 
with 238.8 million, thanks to the fortune of his Heinz-heiress wife Teresa Heinz Kerry.
303
 
                                       From the moment they are elected Senators are forced to scrape in 
dollars for their re-election. New York freshman Kirsten Gillibrand as of January 2012, with 
almost a year to go before the election , has a war chest of 21,8 million dollars for the 2012 
election, where the tally for Scott Brown, her fellow freshman from Massachusetts stands at 
5,3 million. There is still much sense in the late nineteenth-century political aphorism that ‘It 
is harder for a poor man to enter the United States Senate than for a rich man to enter 
Heaven’. One can ask Tea Party Republican Mario Rubio, the freshman from Florida, who is 
busy paying of the personal debts from the 2010 campaign.
304
 
                                       From a point of age the Senate – just like around the 1900s – is no 
reflection of the American working population. True, one has to be at least 30 years old, so it 
is a small wonder that only ten of the Senators are in the age range from 40 to 50. It seems 
that the days are long gone that now Vice-President Joe Biden could enter the Senate at the 
age of 30 years and one month. As of January 2011 there are three octogenarians, nearing 
the age of 90 and only one of them has, by January 2012, announced his retirement.
305
 
Twenty Senators are over the age of 70. Almost a quarter of the current Senate is in its 
fourth term – meaning in office for more than eighteen years – with Hawaiian Senator Daniel 
Inouye present since 1963 and Vermont’s Patrick Leahy since 1975. So, the expectation that 
the Seventeenth Amendment would lead to the extinction of the Senatorial dinosaur, has 
proved wrong.
306
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                                       However, for women there has been some improvement. In the 1928 
Senate, the first one completely chosen after the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, 
which allowed female suffrage, there were 96 males and no female and it took until 1949 
before the first female senator, Maine Republican Margaret Chase Smith, could take the 
oath of office. With the exception of the token female the Senate indeed was ‘the most 
exclusive gentlemen’s club in Washington’
307
 as it was called in the 1950s. But currently the 
number of female Senators has reached the number of seventeen, twelve Democrats and 
five Republicans: an all-time record, but still hardly representative.
308
 
                                       Since the Seventeenth Amendment Senators have been a blessing for 
the voters, at least the ones in their own state. Numerous millions of dollars have been 
transferred from Washington DC to State capitals. It is called earmarks or ‘pork barrel’. The 
late Democratic Senator from West Virginia Robert Byrd was an expert on this. In 2008, the 
last figure available, he managed to gather 122 million dollars for pet projects in his poor 
state.
309
 Democrats and Republicans alike are in it. From the seventeen most successful 
Senators in 2008 only one, Republican minority leader Mitch McConnell, has since supported 
an Earmark Ban proposal in the Senate, initiated and mostly supported by freshmen 
Senators who arrived in the Nation’s Capital on the Tea Party Express.
310
 
                                       The most notorious pork-barrel example in 2008 was the allocation of 
nearly 400 million dollars for a ‘bridge to nowhere’ in Alaska. Its sponsor, the late Republican 
Senator Ted Stevens, a former three times Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, 
threatened to leave the Senate if his colleagues took away his pet project, but they did 
anyway.
311
 
                                       The same year Senator Stevens, accused in a federal corruption trial, 
was found guilty and was defeated at the polls before the conviction was put aside on 
appeal.
312
 Stevens was not the only Senator in the center of political scandal in the past 
hundred years. Being directly elected did not make Senators perfect after 1913. As in the 
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pre-amendment period Senators have been found guilty on charges as of corruption, 
financial and sexual misconduct and accordingly censured or reprimanded.  Some Senators 
resigned office before the Senate could expel them, as it almost certainly would have. This is 
particularly true of New Jersey Democratic Senator Harrison Williams, who was convicted for 
bribery and corruption in the Abscam scandal
313
 and Republican Senator Bob Packwood of 
Oregon, who has been found guilty of sexual misconduct.
314
 Others resigned – Nevada 
Republican John Ensign
315
 – or did not seek reelection – New Jersey Democrat Robert 
Torricelli
316
 – before an investigation was started. 
                                       Five Senators had their reputation tarnished by a financial scandal in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. The ‘Keating Five’, as they became known, were powerful 
and had authority. One of the, California Democrat Alan Cranston, was reprimanded
317
, two 
other Democrats – Dennis DeConcini from Arizona and Donald Riegle from Michigan – were 
found guilty of acting improper.
318
 All three did not seek reelection. The other two had 
shown poor judgment.
319
 One, celebrated former astronaut John Glenn, a Democrat from 
Ohio, was reelected.
320
 And the only Republican in the team not only stayed on and was 
reelected, but in 2010 contested for the highest office in the land, the White House. He was 
Republican Senator John McCain from Arizona.
321
 
                                       The simple fact that Senator’s image and behaviour have not been very 
different after 1913, compared  to the earlier period, does not make the adoption of the 
Seventeenth Amendment a futile act or a Progressive belch;  nor was it a revolution. To 
borrow an observation from Charles Merriam on the introduction of the direct primary: the 
direct election of Senators has justified neither the lamentations of its enemies nor the 
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prophecies of its friends.
322
 With the public sentiment of the 1890s and 1900s Congress had 
to resign to the inevitable. Should the people come to the conclusion that it was all a big 
mistake and repeal the amendment, as happened in the last century with the Prohibition
323
, 
the sky won’t come down. States will almost certainly maintain direct elections as the 
majority did before the Seventeenth Amendment. It will mean another small change in the 
Constitution, that is all. 
                                       Would the people care much about change in the U. S. Constitution? 
Do they hold the work of the Framers close to their heart? At the first Centennial celebration 
it used to be a blind veneration. The Constitution was the object of a fetish worship: it was 
regarded as something peculiarly sacred, a symbol and pledge of America’s national 
existence. In a television interview in 1968 Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black was asked 
whether he thought that most Americans understood the Constitution. ‘No, I think most of 
them do not’ was the swift answer. Surveys show that the American public’s knowledge of 
the Constitution is limited. Close before his death in 1985 former North Carolina Senator 
Sam Ervin, Chairman of the Watergate hearings in 1974, complained in another interview 
that ‘the American people aren’t paying much attention to the Constitution anymore’. 
                                       All three observations are to be found in historian Michael Kammen’s 
A machine that would go of itself.
324
 The next one is too. At the height of the 1937 power 
struggle between President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the conservatives on the 
Supreme Court, composers Richard Rodgers and Lorenz Hart premiered their musical 
comedy I’d rather be right. In one of the scenes the Supreme Court, made up to look like 
nine copies of Chief Justice Charles Hughes, emerges from the park shrubbery to shout ‘No’ 
at the president. Hughes pulls a final coup by declaring everything but the Court itself 
unconstitutional. And that includes the Constitution. The public liked it. The President must 
have been less amused.
325
 
                                       Change is a term traditional constitutionalists like to anathematize 
when the Constitution is at issue. Justice Scalia’s position in Lubbock, Texas is illustrative 
when he warned ‘Don’t mess with the Constitution’.
326
 The remark was peculiar because he 
just had said that he would want to remove the Seventeenth Amendment because it is 
unconstitutional. In the traditional line of thought the only acceptable Constitution is as 
dead as the Framers and each day the Supreme Court is in session its original copy should be 
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brought by horse and buggy from the National Archives to the Supreme Court Building. This 
line is probably well supported by certain circles on the far-right in society,  but the 
emergence of the Tea Party movement makes clear that it appeals to a gut feeling among 
the general public. 
                                       The Constitution is a dynamic text, a legal document of the late 1700s, 
practiced in the changed environments and circumstances of later times. As practice it is ‘the 
contemporary thought and action of citizens and authorities operating under it. It is the 
living word and deed of living persons, positive where positive, and subject to their 
interpretation where open to variant reading’, as historian Charles Beard put it.
327
 Or in the 
expressive language of Columbia University Law School professor Howard Lee McBain: ‘The 
Constitution is {a living, changing, dynamic document,} responding to current beliefs and 
needs and not a work of divine revelation and inspiration’. And: ‘The Constitution of the 
United States was not handed down on Mount Sinai by the Lord God of Hosts. It is not 
revealed law. It is no final cause. It is human means’.
328
  It is very appropriate to say ‘Amen’ 
to that.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
327
 Charles A. Beard, ‘The Living Constitution’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
Vol. 185, ‘The Constitution in the 20
th
 Century’ (May, 1936), 31.  
328
 Howard Lee McBain, The Living Constitution (New York, 1927), 272.  
 82
Bibliography 
Books 
McBain, Howard Lee, The Living Constitution (New York 1927). 
Bellamy, Edward, Looking Backward (New York 1887). 
Benton, Thomas Hart, Thirty Years’ View: A History of the Working of the American 
Government for Thirty Years from 1820-1850 (New York 1854). 
Binder, Sarah A. & Steven S. Smith, Politics or Principle, Filibustering in the United States 
Senate (Washington DC 1997). 
Burdette, Franklin L., The Filibustering of the Senate (Princeton 1940). 
Burnham, Walter Dean, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New 
York, 1970). 
Chernow, Ron, Alexander Hamilton (New York 2004). 
McClure, S. S., My Autobiography (London 1914). 
Croly, Herbert, The Promise of American Life (New York 1909). 
DeWitt, Benjamin Parke, The Progressive Movement: A Non-Partisan, Comprehensive 
Discussion of Current Tendencies in American Politics (New York 1915; Seattle 1968). 
Donald, David Herbert, Lincoln (New York 1995). 
Donnelly, Ignatius, 
     -, Caesar’s Column (Middletown, Connecticut 1890). 
     -, The Golden Bottle, or, The Story of Ephraim Benezet of Kansas (New York 1892) 
Elliot’s, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution, Volume One (Washington DC 1836). 
Farrand, Max, The Framing of the Constitution (New Haven 1913). 
Follette, Robert M. La, La Follette’s Autobiography: A Personal Narrative of Political 
Experiences (Madison 1913). 
Forcey, Charles, The Crossroads of Liberalism (New York 1961). 
McGerr, Michael, A Fierce Discontent – The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in 
America (New York 2003). 
 83
Goodwyn, Lawrence, Democratic Promise – The Populist Movement in America (New York 
1976). 
Gould, Lewis L., The Most Exclusive Club (New York 2005). 
Grossman, Marc, Political Corruption in America: an Encyclopedia of Scandals, Power and 
Greed (Santa Barbara 2003). 
Hall, Wallace Worthy, The History and Effect of the Seventeenth Amendment (Berkeley 
1936). 
Haynes, George H., 
     -, The Election of Senators (New York 1912). 
     -, The Senate of the United States (Boston 1938). 
Hicks John D., The Populist Revolt (Minneapolis 1931). 
Hoebeke, Christopher, The Road to Mass Democracy: Original Intent and the Seventeenth 
Amendment (New Brunswick 1995). 
Hofstadter, Richard, The Age of Reform (New York 1955). 
Holms, John Pynchon, The American Presidents: From Washington to Clinton (New York 
1996). 
Hunt, Gaillard & James B. Scott (ed), Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787. Reported by 
James Madison (New York 1920). 
Kammen, Michael, A Machine That Would Go Of Itself (New York 1987). 
Kazin, Michael, The Populist Persuasion (Ithaca 1995). 
Kennedy, John F., Profiles in Courage (New York 1956). 
Koger, Gregory, Filibustering – A Political History of Obstruction in the House and Senate 
(Chicago 2010). 
Lears, Jackson, Rebirth of a Nation (New York 2009). 
Lloyd, Henry Demarest, Wealth against Commonwealth (New York 1894). 
Madison, James, The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, which framed the 
Constitution of the United States of America (New York 1920) 
Main, Jackson Turner, The Upper House in Revolutionary America, 1763-1788 (Madison 
1967). 
 84
Merriam, Edward Charles, Primary Elections; a Study of the History and Tendencies of 
Primary Election Legislation (Chicago 1909). 
Middlekauff, Robert, The Glorious Cause – The American Revolution, 1763-1789 (New York 
1982/2005). 
Mowry, George, The California Progressives (Berkeley 1951). 
Peterson, Merrill D. (ed), The Political Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Charlottesville 1993). 
Pollack, Norman (ed), The Populist Mind (Indianapolis/New York 1967). 
Rodgers, Daniel T., Atlantic Crossing – Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge 1998). 
Rogers, Lindsay, The American Senate (New York 1926). 
Rossum, Ralph A., Federalism, The Supreme Court and the Seventeenth Amendment 
(Lanham, Maryland 2001). 
Rothman, David J., The United States Senate (Cambridge 1966). 
Sabato, Larry J., A More Perfect Constitution (New York 2007). 
Schattschneider, E. E., The Semi-Sovereign People (New York 1960). 
Smith, J. Allen, The Spirit of American Government (New York 1915). 
Smith, Edward C. & Harold J. Spaeth (ed), The Constitution of the United States Bicentennial 
Edition (New York 1979). 
Steffens, Lincoln, 
     -, The Shame of The Cities (New York 1904). 
     -, The Struggle for Self-Government (New York 1906). 
     -, The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens (New York 1931). 
Tarbell, Ida, All In The Day’s Work (New York 1939). 
Thelen, David P., The New Citizenship – Origins of Progressivism in Wisconsin 1885-1900 
(Columbus, Missouri 1971). 
Tocqueville, Alexis de, George Lawrence (tr), J. P. Mayer (ed), Democracy in America/De la 
démocratie en Amérique (New York 1969; London 1835-1840). 
Turner, Frederick Jackson, 
     -, The Significance of the Frontier in American History (Chicago 1893). 
 85
     -, The Frontier in American History (New York 1921). 
Twain, Mark & Charles Dudley Warner, The Gilded Age – A Tale of To-Day (Chicago 1873). 
Unger, Nancy, Fighting Bob La Follette – The Righteous Reformer (Chapel Hill 2000). 
Weaver, James B., A Call To Action (Des Moines 1892). 
White, William A., The Autobiography of William Allen White (New York 1946). 
White, William S., Citadel (New York 1956). 
Wiebe, Robert, The Search for Order 1877-1920 (New York 1967). 
Wood, Gordon S., The Creation of the American Republic (Chapel Hill 1969). 
Woodruff, Clinton R., City Government by Commission (New York 1911). 
Woodward, C. Vann, 
      -, Origins of the New South 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge 1951). 
      -, Tom Watson Agrarian Rebel (New York 1963). 
Zelizer, Julian E. (ed), The American Congress (Boston 2004). 
 
Articles 
Baker, Lynn A. & Samuel H. Dinkin, ‘The Senate: An Institution Whose Time has Gone?’, 
Journal of Law & Politics, Vol. XIII. No. 21 (1997). 
Barnett, James, ‘The Operation of the Recall in Oregon’, The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1912). 
Beard, Charles A., ‘The Living Constitution’, The Annals of the Academy of Political and Social 
Science, Vol. 185, ‘The Constitution in the 20
th
 Century’ (May 1936). 
Beeman, Richard, ‘Unlimited debate in the Senate’, Political Science Quarterly, No. 83 
(September 1968). 
Brinkley, Alan, ‘Richard Hofstadter’s The Age of Reform: A Reconsideration’, Reviews in 
American History, Vol. 13, No. 3 (September 1965). 
Buenker, John D., ‘The Urban Political Machine and the Seventeenth Amendment’, The 
Journal of American History, Vol. 56, No. 2 (September 1969). 
McFarland, Gerald W., ‘The New York Mugwumps of 1884: A Profile, Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 78, No. 1 (March 1963). 
 86
Filine, Peter G., ‘An Obituary for ‘The Progressive Movement’, American Quarterly, Vol. 22, 
No. 1 (Spring 1970). 
Hays, Samuel P., ‘The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era’, 
Pacific Northwest Quarterly No. 55 (1964). 
Hicks, John D., ‘The Birth of the Populist Party’, Minnesota History, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 
1928). 
Holden, Alice M., 
     -, ‘Commission and City Manager Government’, The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 9, No. 3, (1915). 
     - , ‘The City Manager Plan’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 10. No. 2 (1916). 
Key, V. O., ‘A Theory of Critical Elections’, Journal of Politics, No. 17 (1955). 
Lee, Blewitt, ‘Can the Senate be abolished by Amendment?’, Virgina Law Review, Vol. 16 
(1930). 
Link, Arthur S., ‘The Progressive Movement in the South 1870-1914’, North Carolina 
Historical Review XXIII (1946). 
Lodge, Henry Cabot, ‘The Federal Election Bill’, North American Review, No. CCCCVI 
(September 1890). 
Moffett, S. E., ‘Is the Senate Unfairly Constituted?’ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2 
(June 1895). 
Munro, William Bennett, ‘Recent Municipal Experiments in the United States, Journal of the 
Society of Comparative Legislation (1917). 
Phillips, David Graham, ‘The Treason of the Senate’, Cosmopolitan (1906). 
Pollack, Norman, ‘Hofstadter on Populism: A Critique of ‘The Age of Reform’, The Journal of 
Southern History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (November 1960). 
Riker, William, ‘The Senate and American Federalism’, The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 49, No. 2 (June 1955). 
Rodgers, Daniel T., “In search of Progressivism’, Reviews in American History, Vol. 10, No. 4 
(December 1982). 
Ruppenthal, J. C., Election Reforms: The Trend towards Democracy’, The Annals of the 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 28 (November 1906). 
Steffens, Lincoln, ‘Hearst. The Man of Mistery’, The American Magazine (1907). 
 87
Swift, Elaine K., ‘Reconstructive change in the U. S. Congress: The Early Senate, 1789-1841’, 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1989). 
Thacher, George A., ‘The Initiative and Referendum in Oregon’, Proceedings of the American 
Political Science Association, Vol. 4, Fourth Annual Meeting (1905). 
Tropea, Joseph L., ‘Rational Capitalism and Municipal Government: The Progressive Era’, 
Social Science History, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1989). 
U’Ren, W. S., “Results of the Initiative and Referendum in Oregon’, Proceedings of the 
American Political Science Association, Vol. 4, Fourth Annual Meeting (1907). 
Watson, Thomas, ‘The Negro Question in the South’, Arena VI (1892). 
Welch Jr, Richard E., ‘The Federal Election Bill of 1890: Postscripts and Prelude’, The Journal 
of American History, Vol. 52, No. 3 (December 1965). 
Wood, Gordon S., ‘The Massachusetts Mugwumps’, The New England Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 
4 (December 1960). 
Wooddy, Carroll H., ‘Is the Senate Unrepresentative?’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 41, 
No. 2 (June 1926). 
Zywicki, Todd, ‘Senators and Special Interest: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth 
Amendment’, Oregon Law Review, Vol. 73 (1994). 
 
News Agencies, Newspapers, Magazines: 
The Anchorage Daily News, October 21, 2005, ‘Stevens says he’ll quit if bridge funds 
diverted’. 
The Arizona Republic, March 1, 2007, ‘John McCain Report: The Keating Five’. 
Associated Press, March 1, 1991, ‘Panel Spares Two Senators’. 
The Boston Globe, July 31, 2004, ‘Romney veto overridden – Governor can no longer fill 
vacancies in the US Senate’. 
The Emporia Gazette, August 15, 1896. 
The New Yorker, August 9, 2010, ‘The Empty Chamber’. 
The New York Times, March 29, 1867, ‘A Letter From Ex-President Buchanan’. 
The New York Times, January 28, 1909, ‘Root defines his plan of leadership’. 
The New York Times, February 18, 1911, ‘Fails to Force Vote on Direct Elections’. 
 88
The New York Times, February 28, 1911, ‘Anti-Lorimer Fight Goes on All Night’. 
The New York Times, March 1, 1911, ‘Kills Move to Elect Senators by People’. 
The New York Times, June 1, 1911, ‘Popular Election of Senate in Force’. 
The New York Times, June 14, 1911, ‘Contest Direct Vote Motion’. 
The New York Times, July 5, 1911, ‘To Confer on Direct Vote’. 
The New York Times, September 20, 1987. 
The New York Times, September 8, 1995, ‘The Packwood Resignation’. 
The New York Times, October 1, 2002, ‘The New Jersey Senate Race; Excerpts from Senator 
Torricelli’s Announcement’. 
The New York Times, May 24, 2005, ‘Bipartisan Agreement in Senate Averts Showdown on 
Judges’.  
The New York Times, January 19, 2010, ‘G.O.P Victory Stuns Democrats’. 
The New York Times, October 11, 2011, ‘Chipping Away at Gridlock’.  
The New York Times, December 8, 2011, ’Blagojevich Sentenced to 14 Years in Prison’.  
Roll Call, March 2, 2011, ‘Sen. Akaka Retiring’. 
The Washington Post, November 21, 1991, ‘Cranston Accepts Reprimand; ‘Keating 5’ 
Senator’.  
The Washington Post, May 18, 2005, ‘A likely script for the ‘nuclear option’. 
The Washington Post, April 7, 2009, ‘Judge Tosses Out Stevens Conviction’. 
The Washington Post, April 21, 2011, ‘Nevada Sen. John Ensign to Resign’. 
 
Government Documents: 
Butler, Anne M. & Wendy Wolff - United States Senate, Election, Expulsion and Censure 
Cases 1793-1990 (Washington DC 1995). 
Act To Regulate The Times And Manner Of Holding Elections For Senators In Congress 1866. 
Congressional Globe, July 15, 1841. 
Congressional Record, Fifty-First Congress, First Session. 
Congressional Record, Fifty-Second Congress, First Session. 
 89
Congressional Record, Fifty-Third Congress, Special Session. 
Congressional Record, Fifty-Seventh Congress, First Session. 
Congressional Record, Sixty-First Congress, Third Session. 
Congressional Record, Sixty-Second Congress, First Session. 
Congressional Record, January 4, 1995. 
Congressional Record, April 28, 2004. 
Senate Document no. 232, Fifty-Ninth Congress, First Session.  
 
Miscellaneous: 
John Glenn Archives, John Glenn – Political Career (Kent, Ohio 2008). 
A Record of the Darker Races, The Crisis (November 1912).    
 
 
 
                                        
      
 
 
